The Constitutional, Judicial and Social Pitfalls
Attendant to the Criminalization of Prenatal
Maternal Substance Abuse: A Plea for
Governmental Uniformity and Mercy
INTRODUCTION

The number of fetuses exposed to drugs during gestation is
alarming.' One study estimated that each year approximately
739,200 women use one or more illegal drugs during pregnancy,
and that the number of newborns exposed to crack-cocaine or
cocaine ranges from 30,000 to 159,400.2 Another study, by the
National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education, revealed that each year maternal drug abuse affects
375,000 infants.3 This figure indicates that every ninety seconds
a child is born suffering from drug exposure, and this number is
increasing.4 For instance, the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services reported that the number of "cocaine baI The Chairman of the American Public Welfare Association Commission on
Child Welfare and Family Preservation stated:
Newborns and young children addicted to cocaine make up perhaps
the fastest growing area of the child welfare population. Today in our
largest cities one child in 10 is born addicted to cocaine. One out of
three babies referred to child protective services in our cities is the
child of a drug abusing parent. Crack babies are among our most
challenging problems today-not only are they born premature and
in many cases disabled; they are also born lacking attentive, caring
parents-they are two-time victims of drug abuse. This is a major issue facing the nation and the public child welfare system.
Missing Links: CoordinatingFederalDrug Policy For Women, Infants, And Children: Hearing
Before the Committee on GovernmentalAffairs United States Senate, 101 st Cong., Ist Sess. 3
(1989) [hereinafter Missing Links] (testimony of Gregory L. Coler, Secretary, Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services; Chair, American Public Welfare
Association Commission on Child Welfare and Family Preservation).
2 Gomby & Shiono, Estimating the Number of Substance-Exposed Infants, I THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 17, 22 (1991).
3 Silverman, Scope, Specifics of Maternal Drug Abuse, Effects on Fetus Are Beginning to
Emergefrom Studies, 261 JAMA 1688 (1989). See also Mary M. Kocsis, Pregnant Women
Abusing Drugs: A Medical-Legal Dilemma, 37 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q 496, 502 (1991)
(estimating that 10% of pregnant women once used or presently use cocaine).
4 Missing Links, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Senator Herbert Kohl). Emphasizing the urgency of the problem, the Senator added: "In my home City of Milwaukee, three to six cocaine babies are born every day.... And the skyrocketing infant
death rate right here in our Nation's capitol, now more than twice the national
average, has been tied to maternal cocaine and alcohol abuse." Id.
Health officials in Washington D.C. elaborated on Senator Kohl's report by
disclosing that the city's infant mortality rate (IMR) dramatically increased during
the first half of 1989, during which the IMR rose to 32.3 deaths for every 1000 live
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bies" born in Chicago increased roughly seventy-nine percent
between 1987 and 1988.' The National Institute on Drug Abuse
estimated that ten percent of all pregnant women in the United
States have used cocaine. 6 Finally, a 1989 study conducted by
the Select Congressional Committee on Children, Youth and
Families indicated that fifteen of the eighteen hospitals surveyed
reported a three to four-fold increase in the number of children
exposed to drugs between 1988 and 1989. 7
Prenatal drug abuse presents a variety of potential dangers
to a fetus. The most serious consequence is sudden infant death
syndrome, which often results from a mother's addiction to
births. Kocsis, supra note 3, at 505. This figure represents a 50% increase from
1988 and is 300% greater than the national average. Id.
5 See Silverman, supra note 3, at 1688. Hospitals regularly compile statistics
concerning the numbers of drug exposed babies born each year by pregnant substance abusers. Id. Generally, such records have revealed marked increases in infant addiction and mortality. Id. Moreover, researchers warn that statistical data
probably understates the true extent of the epidemic. See, e.g., Missing Links, supra
note 1, at 118 (testimony of Elaine M. Johnson, Ph.D., Director, Office for Substance Abuse Prevention; Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration). Explaining why most studies and statistics do not accurately depict the scope
of the problem, Dr. Johnson stated:
Many of these women are not in the health care system and are not
being identified. Their infants may appear normal at birth, but experience drug withdrawal symptoms days or weeks after leaving the hospital and developmental delays that persist into childhood and
beyond. Unless this population of women and their infants becomes
linked to the health care system, the tendency is for substance-abusing
mothers to be invisible to studies assessing the magnitude of the
problem.
Id.
6 See Kocsis, supra note 3, at 502. The Board of Trustees for the American Medical Association (AMA) verified studies estimating that "as many as 11% of pregnant women have used an illegal drug, and of those women, 75% have used
cocaine." Board of Trustees Report, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penaltiesfor Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant
Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990). The AMA attributes the widespread use of
cocaine by women of childbearing age in large part to the current popularity of
crack-cocaine, a concentrated, inexpensive and highly addictive form of cocaine. Id.
"Crack" is the street vernacular for small pieces ("rocks") of freebase cocaine that
have been extracted from cocaine powder. Washton et al., Crack, 80 POSTGRAD.
MED. 52 (1986).
Dr. Ira Chasnoff and the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research
and Education studied 36 hospitals around the country and discovered an 11%
incidence of substance abuse. See also IraJ. Chasnoff, Drug Use and Woman: Establishinga Standard of Care, 562 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 208-10 (1989). Another study conducted at a Detroit hospital found that, of the 7,000 total births at the hospital in
1989, nearly 3,000, or 42%, involved drug exposed infants. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, at 4 (July 28, 1990).
7 Missing Links, supra note 1, at 118 (testimony of Elaine M. Johnson, Ph.D.).
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crack-cocaine. 8 A mother's ingestion of crack-cocaine can cause
the uterus to contract, reducing or extinguishing the oxygen supply to the fetus and inducing premature labor. 9 Cocaine use can
also cause a dramatic increase in a woman's blood pressure
which, when accompanied by sudden uterine contractions, often
results in abruptioplacentae-aseparation of the placenta from the
lining of the uterus.' 0 Partial separation of the placenta may result in severe neurological and respiratory damage, while complete separation will inevitably result in fetal death." Other
potential injuries also threaten the unborn2 child, including dysmorphic facial features and loss of limbs.'
8 SeeJoyce Lind Terres, PrenatalCocaine Exposure: How Should the Government Intervene?, 18 AM.J. CRIM. L. 61, 65 (1990).
9 Id.
10 Revkin, Crack in the Cradle, DISCOVER, Sept. 1989, at 64.
I 1 Terres, supra note 8, at 65.
12 The injuries enumerated in this comment represent a small part of the overall
harms that prenatal-substance abuse presents to fetuses. Although medical researchers have focused on the link between substance abuse and fetal disorders for
at least the past 30 years, new injuries are still being discovered. Ira J. Chasnoff,
Drug Use In Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35 THE PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA 1403 (1988). A brief examination of the effects of drugs on the user's
body, however, is instructive in understanding the potential harms.
Cocaine and crack-cocaine are salts and thus are water soluble and pass easily
through the mucous membranes in the nose. Revkin, supra note 10, at 64-65. Cocaine can reach the user's brain within three minutes after initial ingestion, while
crack-cocaine does so in as little as eight seconds. Id. at 65. Once the cocaine or
crack reaches the brain, it triggers the release of neurotransmitters that cause the
user to experience an accelerated heart rate and blood pressure. Id. The drug also
blocks the recycling of neurotransmitters, which creates a "brief period of intense
stimulation-cocaine users talk of euphoria and mental clarity-that is followed by a
tumultuous crash as the nervous system finds itself fresh out of the chemicals it
needs to do normal things like thinking and feeling." Id. This ephemeral yet intense sensory and emotional stimulation and the ensuing crash of the nervous system combine to quickly create a vicious cycle that induces deep depression and an
immediate need for more of the drug. Id.
The degrees of the resulting effects on the fetus can vary from minimal to devastating to lethal. First, cocaine has a sharp impact on the nourishment that the
fetus receives from the mother. KIESTER & KIESTER, BETrER HOMES AND GARDENS
NEW BABY BOOK 16 (1985). Cocaine suppresses the appetite, even to the point of
anorexia nervosa. Revkin, supra note 10, at 64. Consequently, both the mother and
the infant may become severely malnourished, causing fetal growth retardation. Id.
The AMA has reported that, besides infant mortality, cocaine exposure results in
lower infant birth weights, smaller head circumferences and shorter body lengths.
Barry Zuckerman, M.D. et al., Effects of Maternal Marijuana and Cocaine Use On Fetal
Growth, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762-68 (1989). Drug-exposed fetuses also have a
higher incidence of physical abnormalities including deformed kidneys and neural
tube defects. Ira Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use In Pregnancy, 261
JAMA 1741, 1741-44 (1989).
One of the most common effects of drug exposure is the fetal withdrawal if the
mother stops using cocaine during pregnancy. Bertis B. Little et al., Cocaine Abuse

19921

COMMENT

1459

Responding to this prolific problem, state governments have
attempted to intervene in a variety of ways.' 3 A number of state
courts, state legislators and legal commentators have advocated
prosecuting women who give birth to drug-addicted or drug-exposed infants, for either "fetal abuse" or delivery of a controlled
dangerous substance to another person.' 4 Although no state has
statutorily recognized either fetal abuse or delivery of narcotics
to a fetus as a criminal offense, over thirty-five such cases have
been brought nationwide, with mixed results.' 5
This movement toward criminal prosecution as a means of
preventing the births of drug-exposed and drug-addicted infants
During Pregnancy: Maternal and Fetal Implications, 73 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 157, 158
(1989). As Chasnoff observed: "Most significant for the neonate are the highpitched cry, sweating, tremulousness, excoriation of the extremities, and gastrointestinal upset. Withdrawal from narcotics persists in a subacute form for 4 to 6
months after birth, with a peak in symptoms at around 6 weeks." Chasnoff, supra, at
1405. But see Tatiana M. Doberczak, Neonatal Neurologic and Electroencephalographic
Effects of Intrauterine Cocaine Exposure, 113 J. PEDIATR. 354-58 (1988) (finding cessation of fetal nervous system, irritability and abnormal brain wave patterns when the
fetuses stopped receiving the drug, and concluding that such effects were not the
result of withdrawal).
Fetal exposure to heroin presents an additional grave concern. One study
found the deadly virus Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in offspring
of heroin-addicted mothers. See GIACOIA & YAFFE, Drugs and the PerinatalPatient, NEONATOLOGY: PATHOPHYSIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NEWBORN 1144, 1164 (G.
Avery, 2d ed. 1981). See also Missing Links, supra note 1, at 118-19 (testimony of Dr.
Elaine M. Johnson, Ph.D.) (explaining the prevalence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection in young children and its inextricable link to adult
drug use).
13 While this Comment focuses chiefly on the issue of criminalization as an alternative, states have also considered and adopted other measures. In several states,
for example, the birth of a drug or alcohol addicted infant may immediately precipitate neglect proceedings to determine whether the mother is a fit parent. See, e.g.,
In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1980) (holding that newborn suffering from
substance-withdrawal symptoms due to maternal-substance abuse during gestation
constituted child neglect sufficient to warrant appointing a guardian ad litem for
the infant); In re Dwayne G., 411 N.Y.S.2d 180 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (ordering
disclosure of mother's medical records in child-protection proceedings to determine nature and extent of her substance dependency); In re the Doe Children, 402
N.Y.S.2d 958 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978) (investigatory review of mother's medical
records to determine parental fitness ordered as necessary to preserve welfare of
the child); In re Danielle Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985) (unborn
child was a "person" under child protection statutes and was neglected by mother's
prenatal alcohol abuse). But see In re Fletcher, 141 Misc. 2d 333 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1988) (newborn testing positive for cocaine and mother's admission to physician of
substance abuse during pregnancy were insufficient to constitute neglect).
14 See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
15 Dorothy E. Roberts, Drug-Addicted Women Rho Have Babies, TRIAL, April 1990,
at 56. Thus far, charges have been brought in California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, South
Carolina and Wyoming. See id. See also Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Prosecution of
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raises a plethora of constitutional and public policy concerns.
Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
505 (1990).
In Washington D.C., a superior court judge ordered that a pregnant woman be
incarcerated until after she had given birth. Kenneth Jost, Mother Versus Child,
A.B.A.J., April 1989, at 88. The woman, Brenda Vaughan, was convicted for check
forgery and tested positive for cocaine in a pre-sentencing drug test. Id. Commenting on his decision to jail Vaughan, the judge stated: "She's apparently an addictive pergonality, and I'll be darned if I'm going to have a baby born that way." Id.
(citation omitted). The judge also claimed that many of his colleagues had admitted to similarly incarcerating substance-abusing pregnant woman. Id. See also In re
Steven S., 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (ordering a pregnant woman to
be detained after allegations of harmful conduct to the fetus).
In California a mother was charged with two counts of felonious child endangerment when she gave birth to twins, both of whom were addicted to and suffering
from withdrawal symptoms. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 912-13
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977). Despite a public healthnurse's warnings that continued heroin abuse and failure to seek medical treatment would endanger the life of her
newborn, the mother continued to use the substance during the final two months of
her pregnancy and sought no prenatal care. Id. The trial court dismissed the
charges, however, reasoning that "child" as used in the felony-endangerment statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)(1) (West 1988), did not include an unborn child.
Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913. The statutory language, a decisive factor for the court,
."Id. The
read: "Any person who .. .having the care or custody of any child ....
court found that this language "strongly suggested" an inapplicability to prenatal
maternal conduct because it "presuppose[d] the existence of a living child susceptible to care or custody." Id. at 913-14.
Also in California, in 1986, Pamela Rae Stewart was arrested for an alleged
violation of California's child neglect statute, which included prenatal life in its definition of "child." See Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalizationof Maternal
Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmahing Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357
(1989). The police reports alleged that Stewart abused the fetus by refusing the
attending physician's admonishment to discontinue amphetamine use during gestation, to abstain from sexual intercourse because of a detached placenta, and to obtain immediate medical care if she began hemorrhaging. Note, Maternal Rights and
Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalizationof "Fetal Abuse, " 101 HARV. L. REV.
994 (1988) (citing Woman Facing CriminalCharges over Her Conduct in Pregnancy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22, col. 1). Subsequently, a California state judge dismissed the charges because the statute was intended to enforce child support arrangements with regard to husbands who, after abandoning their pregnant wives,
refused to assist in the pregnancy expenses, and not to penalize prenatal maternal
conduct. Id.
In Illinois, Melanie Green was charged with involuntary manslaughter and delivery of a controlled dangerous substance when her infant newborn died two days
after birth. Paul A. Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs,
9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 24 (1990). Prosecutors brought the charges pursuant to a
pathological study of the newborn that found that Green's use of cocaine caused an
abruptio placenta that in turn deprived the infant of oxygen before and during delivery. Id. Additionally, both Green and the infant tested positive for cocaine immediately following the birth. Id. The case was dismissed, however, when the
Winnebago County Grand Jury declined to indict the mother on either charge. Id.
The jurors, Logli speculated, were probably "uncomfortable with the use of statutes that were not intended to be used in these circumstances." Id.
In Ohio, Tammy Gray was charged with violating her duty to care for her child
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For example, it is questionable whether the statutes under which
women are being prosecuted are clearly drafted to provide reasonable notice, as required by the Due Process Clause, that such
conduct is prohibited. 1 6 Another issue is whether these prosecutions are grounded in proof of the traditional requirement of
criminal intent or mens rea. Lastly, there is concern that prosecuting women for giving birth to drug addicted babies punishes
them for their dual status of being pregnant and drug-addicted in
contravention of the Eight Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment.' 7 This Comment will address
concern in an era of
these issues that are invoking nationwide
18
growing incidence of drug dependency.
after giving birth to a cocaine addicted infant. State v. Gray, No. L-89-239, 1990
WL 125695 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1990). The trial court granted Gray's
motion to dismiss on the ground that the state's child endangerment statute,
§ 2919.22 of the Ohio Revised Code, was not intended to apply to the fetus. Id.
Reviewing the State's claim that the trial court erred in not finding a duty to the
fetus, the Ohio Court of Appeals scrutinized the plain language of the statute and
affirmed the lower court's verdict. Id. at **2-3. The Ohio Court of Appeals first
established that parents should be prosecuted pursuant to the statute only if they
owed a duty to the infant at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at *3. The court
then determined that the language of § 2919.22(A) imposed this duty on the parent
after birth because the statute "presupposes the existence of a living child susceptible to custody or control." Id. at **3-4 (citing OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A)
(Anderson 1987)). Accordingly, the court held that Gray committed no crime because she owed no duty at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at *4. Additionally,
the court construed the Ohio child endangerment statute as criminalizing only certain omissions that threaten to harm a child's welfare, not the commission of harmful acts, such as ingesting cocaine. Id. at *5.
16 The Due Process Clause is embodied in two different constitutional amendments. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Constitution states in relevant part: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18 This Comment does not examine in great detail the equally compelling issue
of whether the criminalization of prenatal maternal conduct violates the mother's
fundamental rights to privacy and bodily integrity. For a thorough analysis of the
privacy and bodily integrity issues, see Terres, supra note 8, at 70-73; John E.B. Meyers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 55-57
(1984); Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn.-Protectingand Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1985); Note, supra note 15, at 9981009; Maxwell L. Stearns, Maternal Duties During Pregnancy: Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 595, 598-610 (1986); Sharon E. Rush, Prenatal
Caretaking: Limits of State Intervention With and Without Roe, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 55, 86
(1987); McGinnis, supra note 15, at 517-19; Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of
Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
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Part I of this Comment examines caselaw evidencing a recent
trend in several states toward the criminal prosecution of
mothers who expose their fetuses to narcotics. Part II explores
the potential due process problems that arise when a woman is
charged with either fetal abuse or delivering a controlled dangerous substance to a fetus. Specific attention is given to judicial
and legislative confusion concerning whether the existing child
abuse and drug-distribution statutes extend protection to prenatal life. Part III discusses whether mothers typically possess the
necessary criminal intent to warrant prosecution, and whether
they must possess some form of intent to be prosecuted. Part IV
examines the potential Eighth Amendment violations that are implicated by punishing drug-dependent pregnant women. Finally,
part V analyzes policy considerations raised in the prosecution of
prenatal maternal substance abusers, and concludes that criminal
prosecution is the least desirable form of state intervention to
resolve an admittedly dire problem.' 9
I.

THE TREND TOWARD PROSECUTION

On April 18, 1991, a Florida intermediate appellate court
upheld the conviction of Jennifer Clarise Johnson for delivering
cocaine to her infant through her umbilical cord.20 Johnson was
19 See infra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.
Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). During labor, Johnson, fearful for the health of her infant, disclosed her addiction to the
attending obstetrician and nurse. Amicus Brief of American Public Health Association et al. for the Appellant at 2, Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (No. 89-1765). Subsequently, the obstetrician and nurse took urine
samples of both Johnson and the infant, which indicated a positive testing for
benzoylecgonine, a metabolized form of cocaine. Id. Immediately after the testing,
the hospital personnel reported the results to the Florida Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). Id. Eventually, the Seminole- County Sheriff's
Department investigated the matter and questioned Johnson about her drug use
and pregnancy. Id. at 3. Johnson cooperated with the authorities under the impression that they were trying to help, rather than arrest, her. Id. She stated, "[i]f I see
somebody trying to, see, I'm trying to help myself or somebody trying to help me
and then I'm gonna cooperate." Id.
Subsequently, Johnson was sentenced to one year of community control and
fourteen years probation. Id. at 1. The amicus brief stated: "During that time, she
must, among other things, perform two hundred hours of community service, remain gainfully employed, and submit to any physical or chemical examinations by
her probation or community control officer, as well as random searches of her belongings." Id. n.3. Additionally,Johnson could not associate with persons possessing drugs, consume alcohol, or enter a drinking establishment without first
notifying the probation or community control officer. Id. Finally, if Johnson again
became pregnant, she had to "notify the probation officer and enter a court-approved program of prenatal care." Id.
20
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prosecuted pursuant to a Florida statute that prohibited delivery
of a controlled-dangerous substance to a person under eighteen
years of age. 2 ' The statute did not specify, however, whether
person" as used in the statute included a fetus.2 2 At trial, a
qualified witness testified that some of the cocaine was transferred to the infant through the umbilical cord before the cord
was cut, but after the infant had exited the birth canal. 2 3 Consequently, the trial court determined that the infant had been exposed to the drug after it was born and, therefore, qualified as a
person within the meaning of the statute.2 4
Upholding the conviction, the appellate court acknowledged
that the Florida legislature had previously declined to pass a fetal-abuse statute prohibiting the conduct at issue. 25 The appellate court determined, however, that Johnson voluntarily
ingested cocaine knowing that it would pass to the fetus.2 6 The
court also reasoned thatJohnson knew or reasonably should have
Johnson, 578 So.2d at 419-20. Section 893.13(l)(c) stated in relevant part:
Except as authorized by this chapter it is unlawful for any person over
the age of 18 years to deliver any controlled substance to a person
under the age of 18 years. Any person who violates this provision
with respect to: 1. A controlled substance named or described in
§ 893.03(1)(a), (l)(b), (2)(a), or (2)(b) is guilty of a felony of the first
degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083 or § 775.084.
2. A controlled substance named or described in § 893.03(l)(c),
(2)(c), (3), or (4) is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable
as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
FLA. STAT. ch. 893.13 (1989).
22 See id. But see Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
adopted 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978) (establishing that a fetus is not born until it has
acquired a separate and independent legal existence from the mother).
23 Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 419. The obstetrician attending to Johnson's birth, Dr.
Tompkins, testified that metabolized cocaine derivatives diffuse from the womb to
the placenta, subsequently reaching the fetus through the umbilical cord. Id. at 422
(Sharp,J., dissenting). Thus, although the birthing process restricts the blood flow,
the umbilical cord still transfers a measurable amount of the blood from the placenta to the fetus during delivery. Id.
The prosecution bolstered Dr. Tompkins's testimony with that of Dr. Shashi
Gore, a pathologist and toxicologist, who averred that cocaine remains in the individual's blood stream for up to 72 hours before the liver metabolizes the drug into
the derivative benzoylecgonine. Id. Therefore, Dr. Gore added that a woman who
had smoked cocaine the night before delivering a child would still have either cocaine or benzoylegonine in her system during birth the next morning. Id.
24 Id. at 419.
25 Id. at 420. See generally Brian C. Spitzer, Comment, A Response to "Cocaine Babies" - Amendment of Florida's Child Abuse and Neglect Laws to Encompass Infants Born
Drug Dependent, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865 (1987) (examining failed legislation that
would have imposed criminal penalties for certain kinds of prenatal drug use).
26 Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420.
21
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known that birth was imminent. 2 7 Accordingly, the court concluded that Johnson was culpable under Florida's prohibitions
28
against drug delivery and fetal abuse.
In the case of In re Ruiz,2 9 the Court of Common Pleas of
Ohio convicted a woman who gave birth to an infant addicted to
heroin.30 The appellate court determined that Nora Ruiz, a selfadmitted addict who had used heroin intravenously during the
last two weeks of her pregnancy, violated Ohio's child abuse and
endangerment statutes. 3 '
The court first considered whether a fetus was considered a
person under the Ohio statute, or whether the statute should atId.
Id. The court stated:
Appellant voluntarily took cocaine into her body, knowing it would
pass to her fetus and knowing (or should have known) that birth was
imminent. She is deemed to know that an infant at birth is a person,
and a minor, and that delivery of cocaine to the infant is illegal. We
can reach no other conclusion logically.
Id. The court did not attempt to reconcile whether the transfer of benzoylecgonine
constituted delivery of cocaine within the meaning of § 893.13(l)(c). The provision defining which drugs are considered controlled dangerous substances, commonly known as "Schedule II," did not enumerate benzoylecgonine among the
prohibited substances. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (West 1976). During the
trial, an expert for the state characterized benzoylecgonine as an "inactive metabolite" which produces no effects when transferred through the umbilical cord to the
infant. See Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 15.
The court did, however, certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the question
of whether a pregnant woman violated Florida law by ingesting a controlled dangerous substance, knowing that the substance would pass to the child after birth.
Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court of Florida did not yet render a decision.
29 500 N.E.2d 939 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1986).
30 Id. at 939. The court concluded:
Clearly the natural mother in using heroin so close to the birth of this
child did create a substantial risk to the health of said child as defined
in said section [§ 2919.22(A)]. Accordingly, the court reaches the inescapable conclusion that the allegations of the complaint alleging
that the child was abused have been established.
Id. Section 2919.22 included a prohibition against the endangerment of a child's
welfare that provides:
No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen
years of age or a mentally or physically handicapped child under
twenty-one years of age, shall create a substantial risk to the health or
safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson 1987).
31 Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 939. The relevant child abuse provision, § 2151.031, defined an abused child as one who is endangered pursuant to § 2919.22. OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.031 (Anderson 1989).
27

28
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tach only after birth. 3 2 Although the Supreme Court of Ohio
previously rejected considering a fetus as a person under criminal statutes,3 3 the Court of Common Pleas declared that the child
abuse statute applied to prenatal-maternal conduct for two reasons. 3 4 First, the court pointed to a growing social awareness of
the individuality of the unborn. 3 5 The court observed that several areas of Ohio jurisprudence, particularly property and tort
law, have recognized and protected fetal rights for decades.3 6
Second, the court maintained that the reasoning of Roe v. Wade,37
the landmark case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States demarcated viability as the point at which the state gains a
compelling interest in the welfare of the unborn, constrained its
mandate that the Ohio child abuse statute include prenatalmaternal conduct. 8
32 Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936. The statute that the court applied to resolve this
issue was inconclusive because it defined "child" as an individual under the age of
18. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 l(B)(1) (Anderson 1989). Therefore, the court
resorted to prior judicial interpretations of the statute to ascertain whether "child"
included prenatal life. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936.
33 See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
34 Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 936-38.
35 Id. at 936. The court pointed to Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87
N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949) as evidence of this movement. Id. at 936-37. In Williams, it
was determined that the protections of the Ohio constitution, specifically the right
to legal recourse for injuries articulated in § 16, Article I, extended to unborn fetuses. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334, 350 (Ohio 1949). Cf
Jasinsky v. Potts, 92 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (finding that a wrongful
death action exists if the child is born alive, but dies shortly thereafter); Stidam v.
Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (extending standing to seek recovery in a wrongful death action to a stillborn viable fetus). The Ruiz court also relied
on a more recent state supreme court case, Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053,
1056 (Ohio St. 3d 1985), which based a viable fetus's right to tort recovery on the
fact that it is a life capable of an independent existence. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 937.
Whether Ohio's movement toward recognition of fetal rights in the civil arena
carries over to criminal statutes, however, is questionable. In State v. Dickerson,
275 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio St. 2d 1971), the state supreme court held that a fetus is not
a person under Ohio homicide statutes. Id. at 607. The court stated that its decision
was compelled by two factors: i) the legislature had not so specified in the statutes
despite awareness of the potential harms; and ii) criminal statutes must be strictly
construed against the state. Id. Although the Ruiz court noted Dickerson, it nevertheless held the defendant criminally liable under the state's child abuse and endangerment protections. Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 937.
36 See cases cited supra note 35. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (Anderson 1953) (recognizing a posthumous child's intestate rights); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2131.08(A) (Anderson 1981) (treating a fetus, who is subsequently born
alive, as a life in being for purposes of the rule against perpetuities).
37 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38 Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938. The court stated that under Roe an unborn but viable fetus must be considered a child under § 2151.031. Id. The court parallelled
Roe's state interest in the fetus's welfare at viability with Ohio's trend toward guard-
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The Johnson and Ruiz decisions aptly reflect the position of
those who support the criminalization of prenatal-maternal drug
abuse.3 9 Pro-criminalization advocates contend that the scope of
Roe v. Wade has been commonly misconstrued as extending an
unqualified privacy right to pregnant women. 40 Because Roe
endows states with a compelling interest in the potential life at
viability, pro-criminalization advocates contend, it is not unconstitutional for a state to prosecute a woman for harm done to the
fetus after viability.4 1 Moreover, because there is no fundamental
right to use controlled-dangerous substances, a state is not reing the § 215 1's stated purpose of providing for the care, protection and development of children. Id.
Analyzing the scope and permissibility of a state's intervention with prenatalmaternal conduct under a Roe framework is a complex endeavor that strikes at the
heart of the constitutional privacy and bodily integrity issues. This is examined
thoroughly in a number of other works. See supra note 18.
39 See, e.g., Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal
Protectionfor the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987); Meyers, supra note 18; Parness, supra note 18. See also Logli, supra note 15, at 25-27.
40 See Parness, supra note 18, at 103. Parness construed the Court's decision in
Roe to preclude states from protecting fetal welfare from the moment of conception. Id. Moreover, Parness opined, Roe applies only in the abortion context; it
does not wholly preclude states from protecting the potential life of the fetus. Id.
Others, including many courts, have reached a contrary conclusion. For example, in People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976), the court concluded that "the
underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability is reached, human life
in the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion
that as a matter of constitutional law the destruction of a nonviable fetus is not a
taking of human life." People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (1976). Similarly,
in Larkin v. Calahan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Mich. 1973), the court concluded that
under Roe a fetus is not viable within the first trimester of pregnancy, and thus not
entitled to welfare protection. Larkin v. Calahan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Mich.
1973). Larkin v. Calahan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Mich. 1973). In Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222 (E.D. La. 1980), the court determined that the
word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, did not include a fetus.
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 222 (E.D.La. 1980). Thus, the court
established that a fetus is neither a person nor a human being. Id.
41 One proponent of criminalization of prenatal-substance abuse protested that
"[a]lthough in some states a third person is guilty of murder if he kills an unborn
child at any stage of development without the consent of the mother, the expectant
mother herself may destroy the fetus for any reason she considers appropriate, at
least up to the point of viability. Why, then may she not abuse it short of death by
withholding nourishment or ingesting drugs?" Philip E. Johnson, The ACLU Philosophy and the Right to Abuse the Unborn, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 48 (1990). At least one
commentator has postulated that the state may interpose criminal liability for
harms suffered by a pre-viable fetus as well as a viable fetus. Parness, supra note 18,
at 112. Parness proffered that "[olutside the Fourteenth Amendment context,
states can bestow personhood upon the pre-viable fetus within other federal law
and state constitutional limits. Thus, even maternal crimes against a pre-viable fetus might be possible when the abortion decision is not implicated." Id. Accordingly, Parness concluded that Roe does not prohibit a state from safeguarding the
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quired to assert a compelling interest to restrict a pregnant woman's use of such substances, nor limited to prosecuting only
fetal drug exposure occurring after viability. 42 In fact, some pro-

criminalization supporters propose that pregnant women be statutorily prohibited from using alcohol, tobacco and other drugs
during any stage of pregnancy.43
II.

FAIR NOTICE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Prosecuting mothers for prenatal-substance abuse presents
significant problems regarding potential violations of the
mother's constitutional due process right to fair notice that her
welfare of a pre-viable fetus when such protection is reasonable and does not impinge upon either abortion or other fundamental rights. Id.
Addressing the state's ability to prosecute mothers for harms done to viable
fetuses, Parness concluded that while Roe was chiefly concerned with the potentiality of life in the quantitative sense, the Court's decision and subsequent opinions
espoused a doctrine of state intervention to protect potential life in the qualitative
sense. Id. at 113-14. Accordingly, the state may intervene to ensure that a mother
who chooses to carry the fetus to full term will not engage in conduct that will
produce a debilitated fetus. Id. at 114. This promotion of the unborn's quality of
life, Parness averred, "is consistent with the long-standing and well-recognized
general public interest favoring the avoidance or elimination of handicaps." Id.
This latter assertion has been propounded by other courts and commentators.
In Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960), the New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized an infant's right to be born with a "sound mind and
body." See also Ament, The Right to be Well Born, J. LEGAL MED., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at
24, 27 (contending that a fetus has a right to be born well and defining that right as
the "right of an unborn child to such prenatal care, physically, mentally, and emotionally, as will maximize the unborn child's quality of life after birth.").
42 See Parness, supra note 18, at 97. See also City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479
U.S. 1047 (1986) (regulation of alcohol consumption); California v. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109 (1972) (regulation of alcohol consumption); State of Minnesota ex. rel.
Whipple v. Martenson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) (regulation of pharmaceutical drug
distribution).
43 See, e.g., John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 442-43 (1983) (citations omitted). Robertson asserted in his article:
There is no question that a state could prohibit actions by a pregnant
woman that might reasonably be thought to kill a viable fetus in utero
or cause it to be born in a damaged state. Laws that prohibited pregnant women from obtaining or using alcohol, tobacco, or drugs likely
to damage the fetus would be constitutional, even if these laws applied only to pregnant women. Because there is no fundamental right
to use psychoactive substances, the state would have to show no compelling interest in order to restrict their use by pregnant women. A
statute forbidding pregnant women the use of alcohol or tobacco in
order to minimize risks to their fetuses would pass the courts' "rational basis" test.
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conduct is illegal.4 4 The principle underlying this requirement is
that no person shall be held criminally liable for conduct that was
not reasonably understood to have been proscribed.4 5 Most
states' narcotics delivery and child abuse statutes were intended
to apply to acts performed by and between living persons.4 6
Consequently, the existing state child abuse and drug distribution prohibitions do not clearly place a woman on notice that the
drugs while pregnant may result in criminal
act of taking
7
liability.

4

The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution 4 8 require that an
individual have fair notice of a criminal prohibition before he or
she can be prosecuted pursuant to it. 4 9 In Connally v. General Con44 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
45 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 227 (1957). In Lambert, Justice Douglas eloquently pronounced:
Ingrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice.
Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has a chance to defend charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties are
assessed.... But the principle is equally appropriate where a person,
wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to the bar
of justice for condemnation in a criminal case.
Id.
46 See Logli, supra note 15, at 24 (averring that drug delivery and manslaughter
statutes were not intended to be used in prenatal injury cases); Punishing Pregnant
Addicts: Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1989, at E5 (quoting Kary
L. Moss, an attorney with the ACLU Women's Rights Project, who observed that
the drug delivery statutes were intended to apply to dealers, and that prosecuted
women could not know they were committing a crime). See also supra note 15 (observing that charges brought against Reyes, Green and Johnson were dropped because the applicable statutes were not intended to criminalize prenatal drug abuse).
47 It has been argued, however, that where prior criminal prosecutions for such
behavior have been brought, women are on notice that drug abuse while pregnant
exposes them to criminal liability. See McGinnis, supra note 15, at 516 (stating that
[a] critical method of notice is the reporting of other cases within the jurisdiction"). While it is unlikely that a person consults with a case reporter before engaging in potentially unlawful behavior, a groundbreaking case like Johnson generates
significant media publicity. Thus, whether a pregnant Florida woman who uses
narcotics after Johnson's conviction is on notice is debatable. See id. In fact, on
January 3, 1990, another Florida woman pleaded nolo contendere to charges identical
to those brought against Johnson. Woman Pleads No Contest in Cocaine Birth, B.C. CYCLE, Jan. 4, 1990 (Regional News).
48 See supra note 16.
49 See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 242, 243 (1932) (striking down Oklahoma's "Curtailment Act" as too vague and indefinite to afford a
standard of conduct); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927) (Due Process Clause requires states to frame their criminal statutes to define precisely the
required standard of conduct); Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233,
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struction Co.,50 the Court articulated a standard that remains the
benchmark of fair notice jurisprudence. 5 ' Justice Sutherland,
writing for a majority, explained that due process requires a
criminal statute's terms to be sufficiently clear so that individuals
of ordinary intelligence will understand what conduct will subject
them to penalties.5 2 Accordingly, a statute that does not plainly
state that a certain act is unlawful may not be used to prosecute
an individual for that act because it is unconstitutionally vague. 53
The Court reaffirmed the "ordinary person" standard in
239 (1925) (striking down the "Lever Act" as indefinite and violative of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S.
81, 89-92 (1921) (striking down section four of the Food Control Act as establishing no ascertainable standard of culpability and thus repugnant to the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments).
Thomas Jefferson wrote: "Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding,
and should, therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their
meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may make anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure." Letter of June 12, 1823 from Jefferson to Justice Johnson, appointed by Jefferson in 1804, reprinted in SAUL K.
PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 323 (Duell, Sloan & Pearce eds., 1943).
50 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
51 See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) ("Courts must decline to
impose punishment for actions that are not unmistakably proscribed."); United
States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971) (affirming the principle that an individual may not be subjected to a penalty unless statutory language plainly imposes
it).
52 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. The Justice clarified that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." Id. (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638
(1914)).
53 The Court applied this standard in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, a case involving a
New Jersey statute that prohibited a person from being a gangster. See Lanzetta v.
NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). The statute stated in relevant part:
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime in this or in any other State, is declared to
be a gangster.
Id. at 452 (footnote omitted). The Court determined that the statute's definition of
the word "gang" as "consisting of two or more persons" was unconstitutionally
vague and uncertain as applied. Id. at 453-54. Justice Butler, writing for a unanimous Court, posited that a gang of two or more persons could congregate for a
variety of purposes, including lawful activity. Id. at 457. Consequently, the Court
concluded, it would be impossible for an ordinary person to discern what group
conduct was lawful and what the statute prohibited as a criminal offense. Id. at 458.
Additionally, Justice Butler expressed serious concern with the statutory language
"known to be a member," because the phrase did not differentiate actual and putative association with other persons. Id. The statute, admonished the Court, failed
to indicate what constituted gang membership or induction. Id.
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United States v. Harriss,5 4 which involved judicial interpretation of
55
several sections of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.
The Court reaffirmed the axiom that a person of ordinary intelligence must have the opportunity to reasonably ascertain the conduct a statute forbids. 56 The Harriss majority established,
however, that a statute comports with the due process requirement if its provisions are plainly directed at the general class of
offenses it seeks to prohibit.5 7 Chief Justice Warren, writing for
the majority, urged the judiciary to include only those offenses
that would be constitutionally definite through a reasonable construction of the statute. 58 Accordingly, a statute may not be used
to impose criminal sanctions for conduct unless a reasonable
construction of that statute clearly and unequivocally makes that
conduct a criminal offense.5 9
Applying the Court's interpretation of fair notice to the child
abuse and drug distribution statutes reveals due process violations. Most states in which criminal charges have been brought
against mothers of drug-exposed infants employ statutory provisions that either fail to specify whether "person" includes a fetus,
or explicitly define "person" as someone who has been born and
is alive.6" Thus, prosecutors bringing criminal charges, and
courts imposing criminal liability must use convoluted reasoning
that perfunctorily casts aside the defendant's constitutional right
54 347 U.S. 612 (1954).

Id. at 617. Harriss required the Court to interpret § 305 of the Lobbying Act
to determine whether the defendants violated the provision by failing to report to
Congress any contributions received or expended in efforts to defeat congressional
legislation. Id. at 614-15. In addition, the Court provided a reasonable construction of § 308 of the Act, which required, inter alia, that professional lobbyists register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate,
disclose their employer, earnings, expenses, publications and proposed legislation.
Id. at 615-16 n.2.
56 Id. at 617.
55

57 Id. at 618.

Id.
See id. ChiefJustice Warren stated:
[I]f the general class of offenses to which the statute directed is plainly
within its terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even
though marginal cases could be put where doubts might arise. And if
this general class of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a
reasonable construction of the statute, this Court is under a duty to
give the statute that construction.
Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
60 See, e.g., Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnancy Is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST.
ETHiCS 41, 43 (1990) (averring that the statutory framework of most state statutes
"never intended ...
to create a duty of care owed by pregnant women to the
fetus").
58

59
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to fair notice. For example, in In re Ruiz, 6 ' the defendant was
convicted only after the Court of Common Pleas reviewed the
reasoning of Roe v. Wade and Ohio Supreme Court decisions and
concluded that the trend of fetal protection should replace legislative intent and decades of jurisprudence that defined a person
as one who has been born.6 2 By admitting her substance abuse
example in
to the attending physician, Ruiz became an 6unwitting
3
an unprecedented judicial pronouncement.
While the Ohio Court of Common Pleas's holding is itself
objectionable, the means by which it arrived at that conclusion
compromised Ruiz's fundamental right to due process. Ohio's
child abuse statutes did not specify whether a "child" included a
viable fetus; nor did they define "abuse" to include a drug-exposed infant. 64 Interestingly, section 2919.22, the statute applied to convict Ruiz, enumerated numerous forms of abuse, but
did not include prenatal drug exposure. 6 5 Thus, it is not unrea61 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1986). See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
62 See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
63 See id.
64 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Anderson 1987). See also infra note 65.
65 Section 2919.22 provided that no person may:
(1) Abuse the child;
(2) Torture or cruelly abuse the child;
(3) Administer corporal punishment or other physical disciplinary
measure, or physically restrain the child in a cruel manner or for a
prolonged period, which punishment, discipline, or restraint is excessive under the circumstances and creates a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to the child;
(4) Repeatedly administer unwarranted disciplinary measures to the
child, when there is a substantial risk that such conduct, if continued,
will seriously impair or retard the child's mental health or
development;
(5) Entice, coerce, permit, encourage, compel, hire, employ, use, or
allow the child to act, model, or in any other way participate in, or be
photographed for, the production, presentation, dissemination, or advertisement of any material or performance that he knows or reasonably should know is obscene, sexually-oriented matter, or is nudityoriented matter;
(6) Allow, entice, encourage, or force the child to solicit for or engage in prostitution as a prostitute, or otherwise facilitate a child in
soliciting for or engaging in prostitution as a prostitute.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Anderson 1987). The commentary accompanying § 2919.22 is equally inconclusive. The committee comment provides that failure to support the child through malnutrition, a common symptom of maternal
substance abuse, is an offense. COMMITTEE COMMENT TO H. 511. The comment
also provides, however, several examples of physical abuse that seem to contemplate statutory application only to post-birth infants:
Examples of violations include: Various actions resulting in the "bat-
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sonable to conclude from the language of section 2919.22 that
either the state legislature never considered criminalization for
such conduct, or that the legislature rejected it in favor of other
alternatives.
Similarly, the defendant's conviction in Johnson v. State66 was
affirmed soon after the Florida legislature debated whether
"child" in the context of the state's child abuse laws should be
redefined to explicitly include the criminalization of certain maternal conduct during pregnancy. 6 7 On at least two distinct occasions, however, the Florida legislature rejected proposals to
amend its child abuse protections to include prosecuting a
mother for child abuse based on the infant's drug dependency or
tered child syndrome"; reducing a child to a state of frightened withdrawal to the point where he may become incapable of normal
learning because of repeated punishment inflicted with little or no
cause; and chaining a child to his bed or locking him in his room for
prolonged periods so as to endanger his sanity or risk his arrested
development.
Id.
66 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
67 See Spitzer, supra note 25, at 865.
In March, 1987, state policy regarding state investigations of child abuse was
changed to allow caseworkers from Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to investigate potential abuses immediately after hospital workers notify HRS that a baby has been born with drugs in its system. Id. at 865-66.
HRS can then initiate child dependency proceedings to assure that the neglected or
abused child will receive the care and guidance necessary to promote his or her
welfare. Id. at 867. The Florida juvenile justice Act, which empowers HRS to proceed as such, however, specifically states that its purpose is to preserve family ties
whenever possible, and to begin custody removal proceedings as a final measure to
protect the child. Id. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(b), (c) (West 1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 415.502 (West 1985). The change, however, does not include criminal penalties for substance abuse during gestation as a child abuse offense. Spitzer,
supra note 25, at 868-69. In fact, Chapter 415, which defines an abused child as "a
child whose physical or mental health or welfare is harmed, or threatened with
harm, by the acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the
child's welfare," expressly excludes the unborn from its coverage. Id. An attempt
to allow for criminal investigations of the mother as a result of hospital officials
notifying the HRS, House Bill 155, was later amended to read that "no parent of a
[drug-exposed] newborn infant shall be subject to criminal investigation solely on
the basis of such infant's drug dependency." Id. at 877-78. See also Ch. 87-90, 1987
Fla. Laws 333 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(7)(A) (West 1985)).
Another proposal before the Florida legislature, House Bill 536, would have
predicated the mother's criminality solely on the birth of a substance-dependent
infant. Spitzer, supra note 25, at 881. Because of numerous drafting problems and
statutory ambiguities, however, the proposal met its demise in the House Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services. Id. at 881-82. See also FLA. LEGIS. HISTORY
OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 142-43, HB
536 (detailing the Florida legislature's inability to craft a precise statute).
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drug-induced injuries.68 One legislator explained that "[t]here
was a well-founded anxiety that we were looking to arrest moms
[but w]e are not looking to do that." 69 The legislator conceded
that the state was attempting to intervene, but emphasized that
the state was aiming its involvement at efforts to keep the family
intact.7 °
Indeed, Johnson's conviction in the face of a clearly contrary
legislative intent was sharply criticized by another Florida
court. 7 1 In State v. Gethers, 72 a Florida appellate court held that

the state's child abuse laws did not extend to unborn fetuses.7 3
The court upheld the trial court's determination that Gethers,
who had ingested cocaine while pregnant, 4 could not be held
7
criminally liable for aggravated child abuse.
The Gethers court observed that the Florida legislature considered and rejected statutory proposals that would have criminally penalized mothers of infants affected by drugs transferred
in utero.7 5 The court accurately proffered that the conviction of
mothers such as Gethers or Johnson would wholly undermine the
Florida legislature's stated intent to preserve and stabilize the
family.76
68

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

69 See id.
70 See id.

See infra notes 72-76.
585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 1143.
Id. Cassandra Gethers was charged with aggravated child abuse in violation
of § 827.04(1) for allegedly injuring her unborn fetus by ingesting cocaine while
pregnant. Id. at 1141. Gethers moved to dismiss the charges, contending that the
alleged act was not criminalized by § 827.04(1). Id. The Florida statute stated in
relevant part:
Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or
allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
medical treatment, or who, knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits the physical or mental health of the child to be materially endangered, and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disability,
or permanent disfigurement to such child shall be guilty of a felony of
the third degree.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(1) (West 1976). The trial court agreed with Gethers and
dismissed the charges. Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1141.
75 Id. In so determining, the court rejected the prosecution's theory that House
Bill 155 was enacted to protect fetuses. d. (citing Spitzer, supra note 25, at 881).
Recalling Judge Sharp's dissenting opinion in Johnson, Judge Downey, writing for
the court, contended that most states consistently refused to criminalize prenatal
maternal substance abuse. Id. at 1142 (citingJohnson, 578 So. 2d at 423 (Sharp, J.,
dissenting)).
76 Id. at 1141-42. Judge Downey stated:
I conclude that the Legislature never intended for the general drug
71.
72
73
74
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Advocates of criminalization defend against due process
challenges by suggesting that, as a general matter, any deficiency
in notification to the mother is relatively insignificant because fetal rights have been established and enforced in several other areas of law. 7 For example, a number of states extend protection
to the fetus in a variety of contexts, including inheritance,7 8 and
tort recovery for negligence, battery and wrongful death. 79 Addidelivery statute to authorize prosecutions of those mothers who take
Criminal prosecution of mothers like Johnson will
illegal drugs ....
undermine Florida's express policy of "keeping families intact" and
could destroy the family by incarcerating the child's mother when alternative measures could protect the child and stabilize the family.
Id. at 1142 (citing Spitzer, supra note 25, at 881).
77 A primary basis for this assertion is the interpretation of Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., Parness, supra note 18, at 110-16 (commenting that Roe
permits states to protect the life of the unborn civilly and criminally, and within and
outside of the context of abortion); Balisy, supra note 39, at 1220 (asserting that Roe
is inapposite when applied to a pregnant woman's right to use substances harmful
to the fetus because the right to substance use was not an issue in that case).
Additionally, the Court has not held as absolute the individual's right to bodily
integrity. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding a statute providing for compulsory institutionalization of mentally-ill persons);Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 19 (1905) (upholding the imposition of a fine under a
compulsory smallpox vaccination law over claims of personal liberty to care for
one's own body and health).
78 The fetus's right to inheritance has long been recognized. Essentially, both
the English and American common law erected a legal fiction under which a fetus
born alive was deemed born in utero. See Jeffrey Parness & William Pritchard, To Be
Or Not To Be: Protectingthe Unborn's Potentialityof Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 264-67
(1982); see also Meyers, supra note 18, at 4-5 (discussing the common law tradition of
inheritance and prenatal recognition). One early treatise on American common law
stated: "It is well settled, both in England and in this country, that an infant in ventre
sa mere [a child in the mother's womb] is deemed to be in esse, or in being, for the
purpose of taking a remainder, or any other estate which is for his benefit." R.
TYLER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INFANCY § 151, at 223-24; and § 153, at 225.
The Uniform Probate Code subsequently codified the common law on inheritance. The Code provides that relatives of the decedent conceived before his death
but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1983).
79 Commenting on infant recovery for prenatal injury, the Reporter of the Restatement of Torts posited that "[tihere now appears to be no American jurisdiction with a decision still standing refusing recovery." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869 Reporter's Note, at 79. Prosser added that "a rapid series of cases,
many of them expressly overruling prior holdings, have brought about what was up
till that time the most spectacular reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history
of the law of torts." W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
This development represents a significant transition from the English and early
American common law notions that there could be no recovery, to the rule that the
fetus had to be born and alive before there could be recovery, to the growing trend
rejecting viability as a prerequisite for liability. Meyers, supra note 18, at 6-9. See
also Michael D. Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L.
REV. 131, 131-34 (1979); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of
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tionally, many states' criminal statutes either expressly prohibit
feticide or specifically include the fetus in their homicide prohibitions.8 0 Consequently, proponents of criminalization proffer that
including the fetus in a state's child abuse protections is a natural

and foreseeable progression in the recognition of fetal rights.8 '
Tort Liabilityfor Injury to the Unborn: PrenatalInjuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 Duke L.J.
1401, 1404-13 (1978); Goichman & Hirsh, The Expanding Rights of the Fetus: An Evolution Not a Revolution, 30 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 212 (1983).
For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts stated:
The rule.. . is not limited to unborn children who are "viable" at the
time of the original injury, that is, capable of independent life, if only
in an incubator. If the tortious conduct and the legal causation of the
harm can be satisfactorily established, there may be recovery for any
injury occurring at any time after conception.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 cmt. d (1977).
80 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.322 (West 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 585.13 (1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-201 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.04 (West 1982). An example of the statutory language employed to
expressly extend protection against feticide states:
A person commits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn
child if, in performing acts which cause the death of an unborn child,
he without lawful justification: (1) either intended to cause the death
of or do great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn
child or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to
the pregnant woman or her unborn child.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1988). The enactment of the Illinois statute came one year after People v. Greer, wherein the Illinois Supreme
Court held that, under the state's homicide statute, a fetus was not a person until
born alive. See People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (Ill. 1980).
Other state legislatures have also clarified their intent. For example, California
law defines "murder" as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or fetus, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988). In New York, "[h]omicide
means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a
female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.00 (McKinney 1987). Finally, Georgia law provides that the willful killing of
a viable fetus is punishable by life imprisonment. GA. CODE § 16-5-80 (Supp. 1984).
While these protections clearly extend protection to the fetus against the acts of
third parties, it is uncertain in some states whether the statutes may be interpreted
to penally sanction injurious maternal conduct. See Thompson, supra note 15, at
361 (1989) (contending that, on their face, the existing state homicide and feticide
statutes are inconclusive regarding maternal criminal liability). Interestingly, Minnesota maintains a statutory scheme that protects the fetus from a number of
harms, including premeditated and intentional murder, assault, injuries inflicted by
negligent acts, and injury to the fetus resulting from the commission of a crime. Id.
These statutes, however, expressly exclude the mother as a potential offender. Id.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266-68 (West 1987).
81 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Roe, stated that "[w]e need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159
(1973). At least one commentator has construed this observation as allowing states
to establish that life begins at conception for certain statutes, particularly those
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Although states have protected fetuses in various areas of
the law, those protections do not resemble the criminalization of
maternal conduct during pregnancy for three reasons. First, as
the homicide statutes of California8 2 and New York8 3 illustrate,
these prohibitions are primarily legislatively created and not the
result ofjudicial construction of the word "child" or "person. "84
These statutes are clear in their purpose and scope, and do not
require judicial explication that is unprecedented or inconsistent
with prior applications.8 5 Conversely, most states' child abuse
and drug delivery statutes were enacted before any attempts to
criminalize prenatal-maternal conduct, and were legislated without the intention of prosecuting pregnant-substance abusers.8 6
Second, although at least thirty-seven states recognize a civil
cause of action for prenatal injury,8 7 the development of the law
in this area has been inconsistent and an unemulable model for
criminalization of prenatal-maternal behavior. In a majority of
the states providing tort recovery for prenatal harm, parents are
generally protected from civil liability under the doctrine of parental immunity. 8 Abrogating the general rule of parental improtecting the fetus. See Parness, supra note 18, at 114. Parness posited that this
scheme includes criminal sanctions. See supra note 77.
The Ohio Court of Common Pleas relied on the civil protections afforded the
fetus in state caselaw to reach the analogous conclusion that the state was witnessing an expansion of fetal rights that should appropriately extend to criminalization
of maternal conduct that is harmful to the fetus. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 80.
83 Id.
84 See supra note 76. Confusion would abound, however, if a court attempted to
apply one of the state statutes to hold the mother liable for abusing a controlled
dangerous substance and causing the death of the fetus, if for no other reason than
simply that no legislature has included such a provision in its statutory language.
See id.
85 Id.
86 See Hon. George Bundy Smith & Hon. Gloria M. Dabiri, PrenatalDrug Exposure:
The ConstitutionalImplications of Three Governmental Approaches, 2 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 53, 65 (1991) ("The statutes [the mothers] are accused of violating, however,
generally predate the problem and were intended to address a very different set of
circumstances.").
87 Parness, supra note 18, at 126.
88 The existing scope of parental immunity in tort and criminal law, however, is
debatable and may currently be eroding. At least one commentator theorized that
the recognition of fetal rights in areas such as wrongful death actions is meant to
compensate the pregnant woman and expectant father, not to protect the fetus.
Johnsen, supra note 18, at 203. See also Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830,
832-33 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1983) (stating that wrongful death recovery compensates the
parents, and concluding that "[w]hat is involved here is a right of recovery given to
a parent. The parent's loss does not depend on the legal status of the child .. ");
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munity to deter potentially injurious prenatal-maternal conduct,
with the admirable goal of ensuring that a child begins life with a
sound mind and body, presents several problems. Primarily, recognizing such a fetal protection would fabricate an adversarial
legal relationship between mother and child. The imposition of a
duty on the mother to adhere to judicially-imposed standards of
care would potentially subject the mother to civil liability at the
hands of an individual once wholly dependent on her.8 9 Such a
duty would work irreparable harm to a woman's constitutional
rights to procreation and bodily autonomy. 90
Finally, several of the states in which prosecution for prenaVolk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1982) (finding that Idaho's wrongful death statute "protects the rights and interests of the parents, and not those of
the decedent child").
Similarly, some have contended that state feticide laws are intended to protect
the pregnant woman by deterring third parties from physically attacking the mother
and violently terminating her pregnancy. Johnsen, supra note 18, at 203. See also
Kristen R. Lichtenberg, Comment, GestationalSubstance Abuse. A Call For A Thoughtful
Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 384 (1990) ("Criminal law holds third
parties, but not mothers, liable for acts that harm a fetus.").
There are, however, several cases that reflect a trend in tort law to hold
mothers liable to the fetus for harmful behavior during pregnancy. One of the
most notable is Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). In
Grodin, a Michigan appellate court held that a child could bring suit against his
mother for harms suffered when the woman used tetracycline during gestation. Id.
A California court suggested in dictum that a woman was potentially liable to her
child for failing to terminate it when she knew the child would have birth defects.
Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). See also McGinnis,
supra note 15, at 518 n.71 ("A woman could be held liable for injuring her fetus by
taking action for her own benefit no matter how compelling her need to take the
potentially injurious action.").
89 An expansion of fetal rights in this direction, or conferring rights upon the
fetus qua fetus, may lead to a widely pervasive doctrine of imposing duties on the
mother during pregnancy. A woman may be held liable for failing to eat properly,
smoking, workplace and domestic accidents, engaging in sexual intercourse, and
using anesthetics during the birthing process, because medical scientists have determined each of these acts or omissions to be potentially harmful to the fetus. See,
e.g., M.W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 70
(1984); David Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The PotentialReach of a Human Life Amendment,
8 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 97-102 (1982); Hon. Henry Hyde, The Human Life Bill: Some
Issues and Answers, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1077, 1077-78 (1982); B.P. Sachs, Sharing
the Cigarette: The Effects of Smoking in Pregnancy, in SMOKING AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH 144 (M.J. Rosenberg ed., 1985). See also Johnsen, supra note 18, at 605-07
(detailing the arguments of those commentators supporting the recognition of fetal
rights and recovery for maternal "misconduct"). Johnsen noted: "If the current
trend in fetal rights continues, pregnant women would live in constant fear that any
accident or 'error' in judgment could be deemed 'unacceptable' and become the
basis for a criminal prosecution by the state or a civil suit by a disenchanted husband or relative." Id. at 607.
90 See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text. See also Stearns, supra note 18,
at 606-09 (analyzing the current state of the right to bodily integrity).
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tal conduct has been brought do not extend homicide or assault
protections to the fetus. In Michigan, for instance, a woman was
charged with both child abuse and delivery of a controlled dangerous substance for smoking crack-cocaine less than thirteen
hours before birth."
In People v. Hardy,9 2 the prosecution
charged that the defendant, Kimberly Hardy, injured her infant
by ingesting cocaine during her pregnancy. 9 3 The prosecution
also charged Hardy with delivery of a controlled dangerous substance, reasoning that by ingesting the cocaine shortly before
birth, the mother transferred it to her fetus through the umbilical
cord after it had left the birth canal but before the cord was cut.94
91 People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Mich. 1991). On August 20, 1989,
Hardy was seven and one-half months pregnant when she gave birth to a son in a
medically uncomplicated labor. Id. Although the attending physician noted the
baby's apparently good health immediately after delivery, the following day another
physician observed that the baby was uncharacteristically small for its gestational
age, was vomiting frequently, and had a distended abdomen. Id. The doctor suspected either an infection or drug ingestion and, concerned for the infant's health,
ordered an immediate drug screening of the infant's urine. Id. The test revealed
the presence of cocaine metabolites, which was corroborated when Hardy later admitted to smoking crack-cocaine within thirteen hours of giving birth. Id.
92 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1991).
93 Id. at 51. Subsequently, Hardy was charged with second-degree child abuse.
Id. The Michigan provision defining the offense stated in relevant part:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the second degree if the person's
omission causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a
child or if the person's reckless act causes serious physical harm to a
child. Child abuse in the second degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years.
MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.136b(3) (West 1988).
After a district judge determined that the preliminary examination disclosed
evidence sufficient to support the charges and bind Hardy to the circuit court on
both counts, Hardy moved to quash the charges. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 52. The
circuit court granted Hardy's motion to quash the charge of second-degree child
abuse, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Hardy's ingestion
of cocaine while pregnant caused the child serious physical harm within the ambit
of § 750.136b(3). Id.
94 Id. A similar charge was brought in Johnson. See Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d
419, 419-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). At the preliminary hearing in district court,
a neonatology specialist testified that a child's birth is not recorded when the umbilical cord is clamped or severed, but when the child has exited the mother's birth
canal. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d at 52. The specialist added that if a woman ingests cocaine 13 hours before birth, it is likely that a limited amount of the drug will pass
from the mother to the infant through the umbilical cord between the time when
the child exits the birth canal and the time the umbilical cord is severed. Id. Subsequently, the circuit court upheld the delivery of cocaine charge over Hardy's motion to quash, and the defendant appealed. Id. at 50, 52.
The Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the circuit court's refusal to quash
the drug delivery charge. Id. at 52. The court held that Michigan's delivery statutes
were not intended to prosecute a substance-abusing mother for passing cocaine to
her child in utero. Id. Instead, the court properly suggested that the appropriate

1992]

COMMENT

1479

Neither Michigan's delivery statute nor its child abuse statute defined "person" or "child" specifically to include or preclude protection of the fetus. 95 Interestingly, judicial interpretation of the
state's homicide and assault provisions limits their application to
persons born alive. 9 6 It is therefore inconsistent and illogical to
conclude that these two statutes, particularly the abuse or endangerment statute, apply to prenatal life. Such a rule would allow
for the conviction of a mother for injuring an infant through
drug-exposure, while the homicide statute would prohibit prosecuting a mother for fetal death or sudden infant death syndrome,
which is the most grave consequence of prenatal drug exposure.
Johnson and Hardy provided ingenious prosecutorial contentions that the recipients of the mothers' ingested drugs were persons who had been born.9 7 An analysis of these charges,
however, reveals their deviations from legislative intent. 98 It is a
basic medical fact that a fetus is still dependent on the mother so
long as the two lives are attached through the umbilical cord. 9 9
forum in which to resolve this question was the legislature, where there would be
careful consideration of public policy and the ramifications of criminalization of
such conduct. Id. at 53.
A concurring judge voiced several concerns regarding the potential prosecution of Hardy and others similarly situated. Id. at 53-56 (Reilly, J., concurring). Primarily, the concurrence questioned whether the legislature ever intended to
criminalize pregnant substance abusers. Id. at 54 (Reilly, J., concurring). Judge
Reilly offered a negative response to this issue, contending that even under Roe a
fetus is not accorded the full rights and duties of a person. Id. at 53-54 (Reilly, J.,
concurring). Additionally, the concurrence speculated that accepting the prosecution's theory of delivery, as explained by the neonatologist expert, would lead to
the absurd result of punishing a woman for the involuntary act of premature labor.
Id. at 54 (Reilly, J., concurring). See also infra note 203 and accompanying text (examining the potential unconstitutionality of prosecuting a woman for the involuntary act of passing the drugs to the fetus and deciding to give birth to the child).
95 Michigan's child abuse statute, which was applied in Hardy, defined child as "a
person who is less than 18 years of age and is not emancipated by operation of law
... MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 750.136b(l)(a) (West 1988). Equally inconclusive
is the statutory language defining "person" for the state's drug delivery prohibition, which stated: " 'Person' means an individual, partnership, cooperative, association, private corporation, personal representative, receiver, trustee, assignees, or
any other legal entity." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.1106 (West 1978).
96 See, e.g., People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. App. 1980), appeal denied,
334 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. App. 1980) (holding that a statute declaring it a misdemeanor to cause the death of another by reckless or negligent operation of a motor
vehicle did not apply to unborn fetuses because legislature did not expressly mandate such application).
97 See supra notes 20-28, 91-95 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 20-32, 92-95 and accompanying text.
99 See KIESTER & KIESTER, supra note 12, at 16 (explaining the physiological process by which the mother passes blood, oxygen and nourishment to the fetus
through the umbilical cord).
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Holding that the fetus, although still reliant on the mother and
still gaining sustenance through the umbilical cord, is a life because it has changed physical position with respect to the mother,
ignores both scientific theory and an ordinary person's understanding of the phenomena of procreation. Moreover, reaching
this conclusion by judicial construction not only disallows legislative investigation of prenatal substance abuse to determine an
optimal remedial framework, but also avoids giving mothers fair
notice that such conduct renders them criminally liable.
A state could obviate the fair notice problem by enacting a
statute explicitly criminalizing maternal drug abuse during pregnancy, or by amending its preexisting drug delivery and child
abuse laws to expressly prohibit in utero drug transfers.' 0 0 The
state, however, must still prove that the mother had the necessary
criminal intent to be charged with delivering a controlled substance to a minor. 10 1
III.

MENS REA AND CRIMINAL INTENT

A basic precept of criminal law is the prevention of socially
undesirable conduct. 10 2 By imposing punitive sanctions for the
commission or omission of certain acts, criminal law seeks to prevent unacceptable conduct. 0 3 For most crimes, particularly
those imposing more severe sanctions, 10 4 the prosecution bears
the burden of proving the defendant possessed some level of intent to commit either direct or indirect harm.'0 5 Since Greek and
100 See supra note 99 and accompanying text and infra text accompanying note
101.
101 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.

102 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 4.1, at 306-07 (2d

ed. 1986). Lafave and Scott stated that criminally sanctioning offenders of the law
sets an example for the general public that society deems such violations intolerable. Id. at 307. The authors posited, however, that this goal of the criminal law is
not effectively met unless the actor possesses the capacity to understand that his
society's justice system holds him responsible for the consequences of his acts. Id.
Thus, "[i]t would be widely regarded as incalculably cruel and unjust to incarcerate
men who are not personally responsible in order to serve social functions." Id.
(quoting A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13 (1967)).
103 See id. at 306.
104 See Frances Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 72

(1933) (noting that the Court has generally held strict liability to be generally inappropriate for offenses punishable by incarceration).
105 In a variety of cases, courts have invalidated as unconstitutional jury instructions that created a rebuttable presumption that the mens rea elements of a crime
were fulfilled. See, e.g., Berkovitz v. United States, 213 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1955);
Bloch v. United States, 221 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1959); Hall v. State, 272 So. 2d 590
(Crim. App. 1973); State v. Warbritton, 506 P.2d 1152 (1973); Wardlaw v. United
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Roman law,' °6 legislatures and courts have typically considered
the actor's state of mind a necessary component in determining
the existence and degree of the actor's culpability. 0 7
While the Supreme Court of the United States has never explicitly embraced mens rea as a constitutional requirement, 10 8 it
has employed an intent element to decide the constitutionality of
penal statutes in a number of cases.'0 9 In Morissette v. United
States, 1° the Court held that criminal intent was an essential element of the crime of stealing or otherwise unlawfully procuring
federal property."' The Court overturned the conviction of
Morissette, who had taken discarded casings from a federal
bombing range under the erroneous impression that the spent
shells were abandoned." 2 JusticeJackson, writing for the Court,
stressed that the criminal intent requirement had been as integral
States, 203 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953). The Court has enunciated a similar rule,
stating:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (emphasis in original). Additionally, the
Court has held that jury instructions requiring the defendant to rebut a presumption that he intended to murder violated his Fourteenth Amendment right that the
state prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522 (1979).
106 See Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 126, 129 (1951).
107 One legal historian noted that "[h]istorically, our substantive criminal law is
based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and freely choosing to
do wrong." EzRA POUND, Introduction, FRANCES BOWES SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL
LAW ix (1927).
108 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968) (plurality) ("[T]his Court has
never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea.").
109 See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394 (1979); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422
(1977); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1921); ShevlinCarpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910). See also infra notes 110-30 and
accompanying text.
110 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
1'' Id. at 263.
112 Id. at 276. Morissette, during a pre-trial investigation, openly and eagerly admitted his actions to the authorities and explained that he believed the property
was abandoned. Id. at 248. After the investigation, Morissette was indicted, convicted and sentenced for illegally and wilfully converting the used explosive casings. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction after
reading the statute as creating two offenses: i) a knowing conversion of government
property; and ii) a conversion for which no mens rea was required. Morissette v.
United States, 187 F.2d 427 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 342 U.S. 246 (1951). The Court
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a part of "mature systems of law" as the basic belief in free will
and the individual's ability to choose between right and wrong.",3
Tracing the origins of intent from its early Biblical beginnings to
its present venerable status in American jurisprudence, the majority emphasized that the role of mens rea in separating the innocent from the blameworthy remained a universal and timeless
imperative for any criminal justice system respectful of human
rights.' 14

The Court in Morissette also expressed concern for any justice
system that summarily discards the intent requirement." 15 Justice

Jackson predicted that the removal of the mens rea requirement
would do little to protect the defendant's right to a fair adjudication of his case, but would in fact compromise the common law
notion that evil purpose is a necessary accompaniment to an unlawful act." 6 Finally, the Court observed that the intent requirement also serves the essential purpose of preventing courts from
enlarging the scope of an enacted offense by using potentially
broad or vague statutory language to construct a crime that the
legislature did not specifically contemplate." 17 Thus, the Court
held that criminal intent was essential to Morissette's prosecution
even though the statute' 819prohibiting his conduct did not require a mens rea element."
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,'20 the Court cham-

pioned the Morissette decision in holding that strict liability was
granted certiorari in an effort to elucidate the profoundly murky principles of mens
rea and criminal intent. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247.
113 Id. at 250.
114 Id. at 250-51.
115 Id. at 263.
116 Id. Justice Jackson stated that "[the purpose and obvious effect of doing
away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to
conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from
innocence of evil purpose .
Id.
117 Id.
118 Morissette was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which read in pertinent part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use
or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes
of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States
or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof... .shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both, but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $ 100, he shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1948).
119 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263.
120 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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inappropriate in determining criminal liability for antitrust offenses.' 2 1 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, observed that although the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust
Act 12 2 under which the charges were brought did not articulate a
mens rea component, 23 there were two reasons for reading it
into the Act.124 First, the Court recognized the mens rea requirement as a general rule in Anglo-American jurisprudence, not an
exception to it.' 25 Relying on the spirit of the Morissette decision

and the language of the Model Penal Code, 1 26 the Court postulated that intent remains an indispensable requirement of most
criminal offenses. 1 27 Second, the Court implied that strict liability, while applicable in some instances,' 28 is inappropriate when
121 Id. at 436. The Court stated that "the holding in Morissette can be fairly read
as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common
law, an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required." Id. at 437. Accordingly, the Court proclaimed that in cases where the provision defining the offense
did not specify a mens rea requirement, the judiciary should presume that Congress intended the inclusion of an intent element, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Id. See also Mornisette, 342 U.S. at 265 ("[I]t is significant that we have not found, nor
has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly
eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from the common law.").
122 Insightful and thorough legal analysis of the Sherman Act and its attendant
effects of corporate deterrence through severe sanctions is provided in Hon. Robert Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 78 (1978); Sanford Kadish, Some Observations On
the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423
(1963).
123 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444. The Court further noted that the language of the
Sherman Antitrust Act left unanswered the decisive question of whether the prosecution was required to prove that the charged company's conscious objective was to
violate the Act, or whether it merely had to show that the company engaged in the
conduct knowing that the offense was a likely result. Id. The Court concluded that
an antitrust suit could be based on a demonstration that the company knew the
probable consequences of its actions and that those consequences in fact had an
anti-competitive effect. Id.
124 Id. at 436-42.
125 Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
126 Id. at 437. A thorough analysis of the Model Penal Code's mens rea framework is beyond the scope of this Comment. It should be noted, however, that
under the Model Penal Code criminal intent remains a sine qua non of most offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("This
section expresses the Code's basic requirement that unless some element of mental
culpability is proved with respect to each material element of the offense, no valid
criminal conviction may be obtained .... ").
127 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 436-37. The Court commented that "[a]lthough Blackstone's 'vicious will' has been replaced by more sophisticated and less colorful characterizations of the mental state required to support criminality... intent generally
remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense." Id. at 437 (citing ALI
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962)).
128 See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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the potential penalties are severe. 129 When applying strict liability, Chief Justice Burger recommended, prosecutors and courts
should opt for non-penal
alternatives instead of a sentence in30
volving imprisonment. 1

Although Morissette and Gypsum do not imbue the mens rea
element with a constitutional basis, the two cases reflect the
Court's consistent unwillingness to diminish significantly the importance of the intent requirement. The criminalization of prenatal drug use, however, does not pay equal judicial deference to
the concept that culpability is contingent on an individual's intent
to do evil. It is difficult to imagine that any pregnant woman
would ingest a controlled dangerous substance to deliberately
harm her baby. 3 ' Accordingly, a finding of the requisite criminal
intent can be reached only
after examining the underlying causes
32
of prenatal-drug abuse.

Medical science no longer accepts as true the contention that
addiction is simply the failure of the human will, because such a
perception does not fairly recognize the conglomeration of physical, emotional and societal dynamics that contribute to narcotic
abuse. 133 An addict's ingestion of narcotics is the product of
129 Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 442 n.18. Chief Justice Burger decoded the severity of
the Sherman Act's sanctions, which included fines ranging from $100,000 to
$1,000,000 and three years of imprisonment, as evidencing further support for the
Court's refusal to find strict-liability offenses in the act. Id. (citing Sayre, supra note
104, at 72 (strict liability generally inappropriate for offenses punishable by
incarceration)).
130 Id. at 442.
131 See Chasnoff, supra note 12, at 1405-06; Revkin, supra note 10, at 66 (asserting
that a crack abusing pregnant woman does not consider the care of the fetus).
132 See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
133 Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal
Penaltiesfor Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667
(1990) [hereinafter Legal Interventions] (quoting Drug Abuse in the United States: A Policy
Report: Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 137th Annual Meeting of the Board of
Trustees of the American Medical Association (June 26, 1988)).
The American Medical Association (AMA) stated that complex and varied societal, environmental and hereditary factors cause substance abuse and addiction. Id.
at 2667. For example, pregnant substance abusers often suffer other severe
stresses contributing to their abuse. For example, one study cited by the AMA
Board of Trustees found that 70% of all female substance abusers were sexually
abused before the age of 16. See Missing Links, supra note 1, at 62 (testimony of
Teresa Ann Hagan, M.S.W., Program and Clinical Coordinator of the Family
Center, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital). Additionally, 83% of the female
substance abusers surveyed had a substance-dependent parent. Id. Moreover, 70%
of female substance abusers report having been beaten as children. Id. The study
also established that 10% of the pregnant women and children seeking care at the
Family Center were homeless, and that 50% of the patients had experienced
problems obtaining housing in the past. Id. The study concluded that "[t]he fami-
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physical and emotional urges to satisfy a need, and thus is not
necessarily a voluntary act.13 4 Medical researchers, including the
American Medical Association, agree that cocaine, crack-cocaine
and heroin produce psychological and physiological addictions
that require intensive medical treatment to rehabilitate. 135 Thus,
the harm that a substance-abusing mother inflicts on a fetus is
most likely not intended, but rather is the unavoidable physical
36
consequence of the abuse itself.'
Even if the mother's behavior could be considered voluntary
or knowing, it is still unlikely that her conduct could even be considered reckless. The reckless standard requires a showing that
lies of the drug dependent women had higher levels of family conflict, physical
violence, and lower levels of familial cohesion." Id.
134 Legal Interventions, supra note 133, at 2667. As a result, the AMA Board of
Trustees contended, incarceration would not effectively deter prenatal substance
abuse. Id. First, the AMA observed, drugs are readily available in prison. Id. See also
D.C. Moss, Pregnant? Go Directly to Jail, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 20; Drug Use at
Lorton 'Disturbing" Increased Demand by PrisonersFeared, WASH. POST, July 3, 1989, at
BI; Susan Wallace et al., Drug Treatment, FED. PRISON J., Summer 1991, at 32-40
(examining the massive influx of drug-abusing inmates and the federal government's responses).
Second, the AMA remarked, the existing sanctions against possession and use
of illegal substances obviously fail to deter women. Legal Interventions, supra note
133, at 2668. Finally, the prosecution of substance-abusing pregnant women is a
misguided attempt at deterrence because it fails to address the various factors contributing to addiction. One commentator noted that the "poverty, rootlessness,
and personal inadequacy, which are at the bottom of [substance abuse], are scarcely
deterrable by the threat of criminal conviction." SANFORD KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 29 (1987), quoted in Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 18. See also F. Allen,
THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-9 (1964) ("No one can seriously suggest
that the threat of fines and jail sentences actually deters habitual drunkenness or
alcoholic addiction.").
135 The AMA stated:
It is not unreasonable to assume that at-risk pregnant women would
be deterred from seeking contact with those people or institutions
who might take action leading to their incarceration. Pregnant women will be likely to avoid seeking prenatal or other medical care for
fear that their physicians' knowledge of substance abuse or other potentially harmful behavior could result in a jail sentence rather than
proper medical treatment...
... Substance dependence and contributing factors cannot be used as
an excuse for disregarding the consequences of dependent behavior
on fetal and infant health. However, the magnitude of the problem
and the influence of aggravating factors may preclude criminal sanctions from being an effective deterrent.
Legal Interventions, supra note 133, at 2667, 2668.
136 Id. at 2667-68. The AMA commented: "If a pregnant woman suffers from a
substance dependency, it is the physical impossibility of avoiding an impact on fetal
health that causes severe damage to the fetus, not an intentional or malicious wish
to cause harm." Id.
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the mother acted with conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the child would be injured as a result of the
drug abuse or dependency. 1 37 The application of this standard is
suspect because it presupposes that the average substance-abusing woman possesses a certain degree of knowledge about an
area that medical experts are still pioneering.' 3 8 For example, a
common misconception among substance-abusing women, particularly those in poverty-stricken areas, is that the ingestion of
crack-cocaine induces early and less painful labor. 139 Additionally, while the potential for fetal injury is significant, many substance-abusing women deliver normal, healthy babies. 4 '
Therefore, it may be difficult for both these women and even
medical experts to predict when fetal harms may result. 4 ' Finally, the medical community itself does not completely understand the full ramifications of prenatal-substance abuse, 14 2 and
137 The Model Penal Code provided:

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
138 See Mofenson & Caraccio, Cocaine, 16 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 864,

872 (Nov. 1987)
("The data on infants of mothers who used cocaine during pregnancy are incomplete, controversial, and largely anecdotal."), cited in Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at
19 (No. 89-1765).
139 Terres, supra note 8, at 65 n.30.
140 See Kathleen Nolan, ProtectingFetusesfrom PrenatalHazards: Whose Crimes? What
Punishment?, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 13, 14 (1990) (observing that "[t]he percentage
of infants exposed to cocaine who will demonstrate these effects has not been determined."). See also Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perilsof Prosecution, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 33 (1990) (noting that, despite the harmful effects of
narcotics and alcohol, "a surprising number of children of substance abusers escape damage").
141 Terres, supra note 8, at 68.
142 Mariner et al., supra note 140, at 33. These commentators observed that medical research has still not clearly delineated the effects of occasional, as opposed to
heavy, cocaine use. Id. Moreover, they noted, determining the precise effects of
cocaine on fetuses is often marred by other factors commonly associated with substance abusing pregnant women, such as poor nutrition, inadequate prenatal medical care, and the use of alcohol and tobacco. Id. The authors concluded:
Thus, drug use may not be the primary determinant of poor birth
outcomes. Stopping drug use during pregnancy will not always guarantee a healthy baby. Continued drug use does not always cause damage. Moreover, the long-term effects of drug use are still under study.
The degree to which children who are born prematurely, or with low
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cannot predict with certainty the types of drugs, the dosages or
43
the timing of ingestion that will most likely cause fetal injury.1
The need for more information is compounded by the abject
dearth of educational and prenatal-substance abuse facilities
available to women.144 Those facilities that do provide prenatalsubstance abuse treatment are vastly ill-equipped to provide adequate services for the prolific numbers of substance-dependent
women. 145 Moreover, many substance-abuse programs simply
refuse to treat pregnant women. 14 6 Because of disagreement in
the medical community about the appropriate avenues of treatment, these facilities fear incurring liability for failed rehabilitative efforts. 14 7 For example, a study of ninety-five percent of all
drug treatment programs in New York revealed that fifty-four
percent of them refused to treat pregnant women, sixty-seven
percent denied treatment to pregnant women on medicaid and
eighty-seven percent declined to treat pregnant women addicted
to crack-cocaine and on medicaid.' 48 The result is simply that
those who do seek help during pregnancy to protect themselves
and to optimize the fetus's chances of good health are constantly
49
turned away. 1
In light of these facts, the contention that a woman who
either abuses or is addicted to controlled-dangerous substances
birth weight or small head size, are actually prejudiced in their development remains to be seen.
Id.
143 See id.

144 The National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, Inc.
(NASADAD) estimated in 1990 that while 280,000 pregnant women nationwide required drug rehabilitation, less than 11% of those women actually received care. See
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO LLOYD BENTSEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITrEE ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE at 8 (June 28, 1990). One hospital in
Boston reported receiving over 450 requests for detoxification services in one
month and eventually admitting about one-third for treatment. Id.
145 Id.
146 See McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing
Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 301

n. 167 (1988) ("Most [substance abuse] centers worry about the liability, so as soon
as they discover a woman is pregnant, they refuse her or throw her out of the pro-

gram.... Even emergency detoxification programs don't want women.").
147 Id.

148 Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of PerinatalSubstance Abuse: Hearing Before the
Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (April 27,
1990) [hereinafter Born Hooked] (testimony of Wendy Chavkin, M.D.).
149 Id. at 1 (opening statement of George Miller, Chairman, Select Committee on
Children, Youth and Families). Chairman Miller remarked: "Women who seek
help during pregnancy can not get it. Two-thirds of the hospitals reported that
they had no place to refer substance abusing pregnant women for treatment." Id.
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while pregnant acts recklessly lacks merit. The reckless level of
mens rea contemplates culpability for a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct observed by an ordinary person in the actor's situation. 5 0 Specifically, the mother must have consciously
disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that drug exposure would harm the fetus. 5 ' While the risk of harm is substantial and possibly unjustifiable,' 52 an abusing or addicted mother
does not disregard the risk consciously if she physically needs the
drug or is unaware of its injurious effects on the fetus. 153 Moreover, a mother making a good faith effort to comport with a lawabiding individual's standard of conduct will likely face the insurmountable
obstacle of obtaining
proper rehabilitative
54
1
treatment.
Although intent has always been a touchstone of criminal liability,' 55 the Court has held that some forms of conduct might
subject an actor to punishment regardless of his or her state of
mind. Specifically, the Court has recognized certain forms of
56
conduct as subjecting an actor to strict liability.'
See supra note 137.
151 See id.
152 This Comment recognizes the substantial risk of harm to the fetus. See supra
note 12. The determination of whether the conduct was justifiable, however, may
be partly contingent upon first determining which is the appropriate barometer of
conduct: i) an ordinary pregnant woman; or ii) a pregnant woman who is addicted
to a narcotic.
153 Additionally, the commentary accompanying the Model Penal Code clearly
attaches significance to the entirety of the defendant's mental attitude. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary on definition of purpose and knowledge (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). The commentary accompanying § 2.02 states: "In the Code's
formulation, both 'purposely' and 'knowingly,' as well as 'recklessly,' are meant to
ask what, in fact, the defendant's mental attitude was." Id. This question again
raises the issue of whether the appropriate standard for determining culpability is
an ordinary pregnant mother or one who is also addicted to a controlled dangerous
substance.
154 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 105-119 and accompanying text.
156 Strict liability is defined as such:
"[L]iability without fault. In the criminal law, offenses sometimes do
not require any general or specific mens rea. The conduct itself, even
if innocently engaged in, results in criminal liability. Because of the
possible harshness of holding people strictly accountable in this way,
the courts require strong evidence of a legislative intent to statutorily
create strict liability before the usual requirement of mens rea will be
dispensed with; and strict liability crimes are usually limited to minor
150

offenses or

REGULATORY OFFENSES

such as parking violations and vio-

lations of health codes.
BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY

458 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis in original).
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In United States v. Dotterweich,'57 the Court observed that
some legislation may impose penalties for an actor's conduct
even though the actor did not intend to commit an offense or
harm." 8 The Court upheld the conviction of the president of the
Buffalo Pharmacal Company for shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, in violation of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.' 59 Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the majority, commented that the Act represented a type of legislation under which penalties serve as an effective means of regulation.' 6 ° Such regulation, the Court continued, dispenses with
the traditional requirement that the actor be aware that he is
committing some wrongdoing, and instead places a duty upon
the actor because he stands in the best position to prevent the
danger or offense.' 6' Consequently, while Dotterweich did not
intend to permit Buffalo Pharmacal Corporation to distribute
misbranded and adulterated drugs, he was held criminally liable
because, as president of
the company, he was in the best position
62
to prevent the harm.1
A state legislature might use reasoning analogous to the Dotterweich opinion to establish maternal-drug ingestion during
pregnancy as a strict liability crime. Arguably, the mother stands
157 320 U.S. 264 (1943).
158 Id. at 280-81. The Court referred to "a now familiar type of legislation

whereby penalties serve as effective means of regulation." Id. This legislation discards the traditional requirement that the actor either intended to commit the offense ("specific intent") or was aware of some wrongdoing ("general intent"). Id.
at 281. The Court in Morissette referred to the acts prohibited by this type of legislation as "public welfare offenses," and noted that these offenses "are in the nature
of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it requires duty." Morissette, 342 U.S. at 246. The Court in Gypsum pointed to the limited number of cases in
which it had recognized these types of offenses and concluded that, as a general
matter, strict liability in criminal proceedings was disfavored. United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978) (citing United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1921); United States v. Behman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971)). See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
159 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 277.
160 Id. at 280-81.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 284-85. The Court refused to speculate on whether there were others
beside Dotterweich who might have also offended the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. Id. at 284, 285. The Court simply remarked that anyone having a
"responsible share" in the furtherance of a transaction outlawed by the statute
committed the offense. Id. at 284. The Court added that Congress placed the burden of acting responsibly upon those who were in the position to learn of the impositions intended to protect consumers affected by the illicit interstate commerce,
and not on the helpless public. d. at 285.
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in the best position to prevent the harm to the infant by simply
discontinuing any controlled-dangerous substance use during
pregnancy. This supposition, however, falters for two reasons.
First, it does not confront the possibility that a mother might
abuse drugs before learning that she is pregnant. It is possible,
for example, that a mother might continue ingesting crack-cocaine for the first two months of her pregnancy and, not knowing
she is pregnant, be completely unaware of the harm to the infant.
Consequently, the mother might not be in a suitable position to
prevent the harm because she is unaware of the fetus, and thus
unaware of the potential harm to it from her drug ingestion. Second, a drug-dependent mother might not be in the best position
if she is unable to avail herself of a rehabilto mitigate the danger
63
itation program. 1

IV.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Given the nature of drug dependency, it is arguable that the
criminalization of maternal drug use violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.' ' Because it is conceivable that neither addiction nor the
physiological process by which the mother passes the drug to the
fetus is a voluntary act, the criminalization of prenatal-substance
abuse may punish the addiction, rather than the conduct. The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that criminalizing the
an addict or alcoholic violates the Eighth
status of being
65
Amendment. 1
In Robinson v. California,16 6 the Court recognized that narcotic addiction is not a crime, but rather an illness that requires
medical treatment. 1 67 The Robinson Court struck down a California statute 16 that made substance addiction a misdemeanor be163 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.

164 See supra note 17 for relevant provisions of the Eighth Amendment.
165 See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.

166 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
167 Id. at 667. The Robinson Court stated that narcotic addicts "are diseased and
proper subjects for [medical] treatment." Id. at 667 n.8 (quoting Linder v. United

States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)).
168 Section 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code provided that:
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to
the use of narcotics... Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced
to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the
county jail.... In no event does the court have the power to absolve a
person who violates this section from the obligation of spending at

least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
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cause punishment for the mere status of being an addict was
cruel and unusual. 169 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, analogized the statute to criminalizing the status of being mentally ill
or a leper and concluded that the statute was unconstitutional
because it criminalized the consequences of addiction rather than
0
identifiable acts. 17
Lower federal courts subsequently applied the Robinson analysis to determine that chronic alcoholics are similarly diseased
and can not be prosecuted for public drunkenness because they
lacked the necessary mens rea for criminal liability. "'I In Easter v.
District of Columbia 172 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the prosecution of a chronic alcoholic for public
drunkenness violated the Eighth Amendment because the
drunken display was an involuntary and immediate result of the
disease of alcoholism.1 7 3 This analysis, the Easter court added,
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §

11721, repealed by Stats. 1972, c. 1407, p. 2987,

§ 2.
169 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The Court resolved that addiction isa status, not
an act. Id. at 662. Enforcement of the statute would make an addict "continuously
guilty of this offense, whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics
within the State, and whether or not he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior
there." Id. at 666.
170 Id. The Court observed that the statute did not punish a person for using
narcotics, or for purchasing or otherwise obtaining narcotics, or for acting in a disorderly fashion after using the narcotics. Id. Instead, the Court posited, the statute
criminalized the status of being addicted to narcotics, regardless of whether the
person ever used or possessed drugs in that state, and regardless of whether he or
she was seeking medical attention for the addiction. Id.
171 See Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding
that chronic alcoholics are incapable of forming the requisite mens rea necessary to
be criminally liable). In Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966), the court
refused to uphold the conviction of a chronic alcoholic for numerous instances of
public drunkenness. Driver, 356 F.2d at 765. Joseph Driver had been convicted for
public intoxication over 200 times between the ages of 24 and 59, for which he
spent over 22 years in prison. Id. at 763. The court determined that Driver was a
chronic alcoholic as defined by the National Council on Alcoholism and the American Medical Association, because he was a " 'person who is powerless to stop drinking and whose drinking seriously alters his normal living pattern.' " Id. (quoting
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, Pub. No. 730, Alcoholism (1965)). Consequently, the court refused to up-

hold Driver's most recent conviction, noting that to do so would punish him for
committing an act that, because of his disease, he was powerless either to intend or
to prevent. Id. at 764. The court added that Driver's conduct was neither accompanied by an evil intent nor evil in itself, because he did not will the act. Id. Prosecution under such circumstances, the court concluded, would surely constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Id.
172 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
173 Id. at 55. The court stated that "[o]ne who is a chronic alcoholic cannot have
the mens rea necessary to be held responsible criminally for being drunk in pub-
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was consistent with the approach adopted by Congress in the Act
of 1947, entitled "Rehabilitation of Alcoholics," 174 which established that a chronic alcoholic suffers a disease that prevents control over consumption. 175 More significantly, the Easter court
stated that its decision would have been the same without the
guidance of the Act of 1947, because an alcoholic simply can not
mens rea to be criminally liable for public
have the requisite
76
drunkenness. 1
The Court forged an entirely different course in Powell v.
Texas, 177 wherein it determined that convicting an individual for
appearing in public while inebriated did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 178 Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality, provided
lic.... [A] chronic alcoholic is in fact a sick person who has lost control over his use
of alcoholic beverages." Id. at 53.
174 The Act of 1947 provided in relevant part:
[T]he courts of the District of Columbia are hereby authorized to take
judicial notice of the fact that a chronic alcoholic is a sick person and
in need of proper medical, institutional, advisory, and rehabilitative
treatment, and the court is authorized to direct that he receive appropriate medical, psychiatric, or other treatment as provided under the
terms of this chapter.
Easter, 361 F.2d at 51 (quoting D.C. CODE § 24-501 (1961)).
175 Id. at 51.
176 Id. at 53. The court stated that its decision, like the Act of 1947, meant that
after a judge determined a person to be a chronic alcoholic, the judge could either
release that person or require him to seek medical care. Id. The court also stated
that it was not absolving the voluntarily inebriated person. Id. Nonetheless, because of the lack of treatment facilities, the court opined, an offending chronic alcoholic could not be criminally sanctioned. Id.
The court in Easter relied heavily on the reasoning of Robinson in which the
Court established that punishing a person for an addiction violated the cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 54-55. Similarly, the Driver court stated that Robinson "sustains, if not commands, the view that
we take." Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
177 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
178 Id. at 535. Petitioner Powell contended that his conviction violated the Eighth
Amendment as interpreted by the Court in Robinson, wherein the Court struck
down a state statute that criminalized substance addiction. Id. at 531-32. The
Court, however, dismissed this claim as a misinterpretation of Robinson, and instead
demarcated the two cases as mutually distinguishable. Id. at 533. The Powell Court
posited that Robinson did not relieve an actor of liability for appearing in public
while intoxicated because the actor's behavior was the compulsively-induced consequence of his addiction. Id. In fact, the Court offered, Robinson did not grapple with
the issue of whether the imposition of criminal penalties for involuntary conduct
caused by addiction violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. The dissent, written by
Justice Fortas and joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart, contended that
the crucial issue in Powell was whether the petitioner could constitutionally be held
responsible for his behavior. Id. at 558 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Refuting the dissent's application of Robinson to absolve the actor of liability, the Court proffered
that "[t]he only relevance of Robinson to this issue is that because the Court inter-
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several reasons for the decision. ' 79 First, the Court observed that
medical experts had neither arrived at a commonly accepted definition of alcoholism, nor reached a profession-wide consensus
that alcoholism was a disease in the traditional psychological,
physiological or biochemical sense. 180 Further, Justice Marshall
maintained, there was much debate in the medical arena regarding the physical and behavioral impact of alcoholism.' 8 ' Conse-

quently, the Court refused to accept the petitioner's comparison
preted the statute there involved as making a 'status' criminal, it was able to suggest
that the statute would cover even a situation in which addiction had been acquired
involuntarily." Id. at 534.
179 Id. at 521-31. Other commentators have speculated that the Court was reluctant to absolve Powell and others similarly situated because to do so would adversely impact on law enforcement. Smith & Dabiri, supra note 86, at 64. Because
absolving an alcoholic of criminal liability would potentially undermine the basic
notion of criminal responsibility, Smith and Dabiri postulated, the majority interpreted Robinson narrowly and refused to apply that case to conclude that an alcoholic or addict is not responsible, and thus not criminally liable, for otherwise
unlawful acts. Id. at 64-65 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 531-32.). Accordingly, Smith
and Dabiri premonished that:
A logical extension of this theory is that just as the majority in Powell
would not extend Robinson to the case of a chronic alcoholic, they also
would not extend Robinson to cover the criminal acts of a drug addict
committed to satisfy her drug addiction. Obviously, if the Powell interpretation of Robinson prevails, then both cases stand as an obstacle to
the criminal prosecution of mothers who bear drug-addicted or drugexposed infants.
Id. at 65.
When evaluating the efficacy and potential ramifications of Powell, however, it
is important to note that this decision was rendered by a sharply divided Court.
Justices Black, Harlan, White and the ChiefJustice joined the plurality opinion authored by Justice Marshall. Powell, 392 U.S. at 516-17. Justices Black, Harlan and
White, however, also wrote separate concurring opinions. See id. at 537 (Black,
Harlan, J.J., concurring); id. at 548 (White, J., dissenting). Additionally, three Justices rallied around Justice Fortas's dissenting opinion. Id. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Moreover, this judicial discord regarding the scope and applicability of
Robinson is compounded because nearly all of the dissenters in Powell comprised the
majority in Robinson. The only exception was Justice Fortas, the author of the dissenting opinion, who had not yet been appointed to the Court. See also Smith &
Dabiri, supra note 86, at 63 n.45.
180 Powell, 392 U.S. at 522. Justice Marshall implied that although the medical
community had classified alcoholism as a "disease" to connote an affliction that
could or should be medically treated, medical researchers could not yet uniformly
detail its nature or even articulate a cohesive definition of what it meant to be an
alcoholic. Id. The Justice added that "[o]ne of the principal works in this field
states that the major difficulty in articulating a 'disease concept of alcoholism' is
that 'alcoholism has too many definitions and disease has practically none.' " Id.
(quoting E. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE OF ALCOHOLISM 11 (1960)).
181 Id. at 522-26. The Justice's opinion aptly reflected the confusion that existed
within the medical community regarding the alleged psychological and physical effects of alcoholism on the human body. Id. at 522. Justice Marshall evaluated the
research findings and testimony of several venerable medical luminaries and con-
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of alcoholism to diseases such as insanity or schizophrenia, which
preclude an actor from possessing the mens rea necessary to al82
low for criminal prosecution.
Second, the plurality relied on the confusion within the medical community to posit that imprisonment presented an equally
legitimate mode of rehabilitation.' 8 3 The Court observed that researchers had yet to establish a generally effective method of
treating alcoholics, who responded adversely to different methods of treatment for inarticulable reasons. 8 4 Moreover, the
Court continued, the existing rehabilitative facilities were so limited in number and resources that medical care for indigents was
impossible.' 8 5 These facts, Justice Marshall proffered, made brief
incarceration as potentially effective a form of rehabilitation as
the medical alternative. 8 6 The Justice supported his favorable
cluded that there was no "substantial consensus as to the manifestations of alcoholism." Id. at 522-26.
182 Id. at 535. The plurality, emphasizing the medical community's inability to
delineate the distinction between an individual who has a drinking problem and
one who totally lacks control over his addiction, remarked:
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol in his hands
will begin to shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he
will have hallucinations; it is quite another to say that a man has a
"compulsion" to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain
amount of "free will" with which to resist. It is simply impossible, in
the present state of our knowledge, to ascribe a useful meaning to the
latter statement.
Id. at 526.
183 Id. at 528. Justice Marshall commented that it "would be tragic to return
large numbers of helpless, sometimes dangerous and frequently unsanitary inebriates to the streets of our cities without even the opportunity to sober up adequately
which a briefjail term provides." Id.
184 Id. at 529. The medical community, concluded Justice Marshall, could not
assure the Court that, even with the proper facilities and trained personnel, chronic
inebriates would be treated by anything more effective than "slightly higher-class
jails." Id. The Justice stated: "Thus we run the grave risk that nothing will be accomplished beyond the hanging of a new sign-reading 'hospital'-over one wing of
the jailhouse." Id.
185 Id. at 528. The Court did note, however, that several pilot treatment programs did exist. Id. at 528 n.22 (citing PRES. COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND
50-64, 82-108
(1967)). But, the Court recognized, the President's Commission established that
prosecution for intoxicated-related offenses remained the only valid alternative because of the paucity of accepted medical alternatives. Id. Moreover, the Court continued, the woeful shortage of medically-trained personnel would detract from any
potential benefits presented by the growth of treatment centers. Id.
186 Id. at 530. The Court stated:
The picture of the penniless drunk propelled aimlessly and endlessly
through the law's "revolving door" of arrest, incarceration, release
and re-arrest is not a pretty one. But before we condemn the present
practice across-the-board, perhaps we ought to be able to point to
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS
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view of prosecution and added that penal incarceration is statutorily limited, thus depriving the offending alcoholic of his freedom
for a limited and typically brief period.' 87 Conversely, Justice
Marshall observed, effective therapeutic civil commitment demands that the alcoholic remain in the treatment facility until
cured which, in light of the unpredictable efficacy of existing
required indefinite and potentially
medical treatment, necessarily
88
lengthy periods of time. ,

Finally, the plurality emphasized that the petitioner's conviction did not fall under the Eighth Amendment Robinson rubric. 8 9
The plurality distinguished Robinson because the statute stricken
in that case punished the status of being an addict, while the petitioner in Powell was convicted for committing the voluntary act of
appearing in public while intoxicated. 90 Accordingly, the Court
concluded, Texas did not seek to punish an individual for being a
chronic alcoholic, but instead for public behavior while intoxicated, which posed an unacceptable threat to the health and
safety of others.,9,

The plurality's opinion in Powell strongly suggests that the
criminalization of prenatal substance abuse is not violative of the
Eighth Amendment. There are, however, two reasons to opine
that the application of Powell analysis to pregnant-drug dependents would either be unconstitutional or at least inconsistent
with other Supreme Court precedent.
First, the Powell plurality's suggestion that mens rea does not
play a decisive role in determining the constitutionality of an ofsome clear promise of a better world for these unfortunate people.
Unfortunately, no such promise has yet been forthcoming. If, in addition to the absence of a coherent approach to the problem of treatment, we consider the almost complete absence of facilities and
manpower for the implementation of a rehabilitation program, it is
difficult to say in the present context that the criminal process is utterly lacking in social value.
Id. Justice Black similarly observed that, at the very least, an incarcerated inebriate
is provided with food, clothing and a relatively safe place to remain until sober. Id.
at 538 (Black, J., concurring). Additionally, the concurrence commented, incarceration prevents an intoxicated person from harming hapless citizens. Id. at 539
(BlackJ., concurring). Finally, the Justice speculated that imprisonment may serve
important deterrent functions, such as providing a potential alcohol abuser with
incentive to exercise control, and reinforcing a chronic alcoholic's motivation to
remain sober. Id.
187 Id. at 529.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 532.
190 Id. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
191 Id.
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fense, but instead is wholly within the province of the states, is
somewhat anomalous. In cases both preceding and following
PoweU, the Court endowed the concept of criminal intent with
maximum relevance.19 2 While the Morissette and Gypsum Courts
did not specify that prosecutorial proof of intent is a fundamental
right, those opinions did continue the common law's maxim that
mens rea analysis in a criminal offense recognizes a person's basic ability to choose between good and evil.' 93 Further, the Dotterweich opinion and its progeny made clear that an actor's intent
was not an element of a criminal offense only when the actor
stands in a responsible position to prevent a publicly injurious
94
act. '
The PoweU plurality may have been reluctant to endow mens
rea with the import accorded to it in other cases because the
Court could not determine with certitude whether chronic alcoholism necessarily deprives an individual of the ability to form
intent.195 Justice Marshall's opinion and its recognition of a variety of theories regarding alcoholism's manifestations and effects
reflects the Court's reluctance to conclude that alcoholism is a
disease in the same league as schizophrenia, insanity, or other
afflictions which deprive an individual of the ability to conduct
himself in a socially acceptable manner.' 9 6 Although modern
medical science continues to explore effective substance-abuse
treatment programs, researchers agree that drug addiction
strongly impacts on a person's ability to discern lawful from un192 The Powell plurality, in its decision to permit states to prosecute a chronic
alcoholic for appearing in public while inebriated, concluded that "in any event this
Court has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea." Id. at
535. The anomaly lies in the fact that other cases that have reflected strong judicial
support for the continuation of mens rea. See, e.g., Felton v. United States, 96 U.S.
699, 703 (1877) ("But at the same time the law is not so unreasonable as to attach
culpability, and consequently to impose punishment, where there is no intention to
evade its provisions."); Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 260-61 (1952) (finding persuasive
the fact that state high courts had retained the intent requirement in most cases);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (stating that
"the holding in Morissette can fairly be read as establishing... an interpretative presumption that mens rea is required.").
193 See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437; Morissette, 342 U.S. at 260-61.
194 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256 (describing such offenses as unique, limited and
of the type wherein "[t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a
position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and
no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his
responsibilities").
195 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.

196 S v' id
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lawful conduct. 9 7 The results of research in this area are prolific
and uniformly indicate that substance abuse, including alcoholism, is a disease in the biochemical, physiological and psychological sense contemplated by the Powell plurality's perception of
"disease."' 9 8 Second, the application of Powell to a substance
abusing mother abrogates or at least compromises her fundamental right to procreate. The Powell plurality distinguished its
case from Robinson by establishing that Powell was culpable not
for the status of being an alcoholic, but for committing the act of
appearing in public while intoxicated.' 99 Accordingly, finding or
upholding criminal liability pursuant to Powell is predicated on
finding the commission of an act in addition to the abuse or addiction. Prosecuting mothers for child abuse or drug delivery
would entail the criminalization of two acts: i) the involuntary
physiological process by which she passes the drug or its metabolic derivative to the fetus; and ii) giving birth to the fetus.2 ° °
The involuntary physical process of passing the drug,
although a form of "distribution," is an act which the mother can
neither control nor stop. Because the Powell plurality predicated
the conviction upon the initial conclusion that the petitioner voluntarily appeared in public, 20 1 that case is inapposite as applied
to prosecution of a pregnant woman for the involuntary delivery
of a controlled-dangerous substance.20 2
197

See supra note 12.

198 See id.

199 See supra note 178.
Advocates of an acquittal in the Johnson case articulated the alternate theory
that prosecuting Johnson merely punished her for the dual status of being an addict
and pregnant. See Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 28, Johnson (No. 89-1765) ("To
punish her for that delivery is, therefore, to punish her for her combined status as a
pregnant woman and a drug addict."). Explaining why the maternal drug ingestion
does not constitute the act in addition to the addiction or abuse, another opponent
of criminalization added:
The prosecution of addicted mothers punishes for the combined status of being addicted and being pregnant. Defendants are not
charged simply for using drugs, but for biological consequences from
drug use that can occur only if they also happen to be pregnant. An
addict who discovers that she is pregnant cannot definitely avoid this
added punishment unless she aborts the fetus.
Roberts, supra note 15, at 58.
201 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533-34 (1968). See also supra note 178 (explaining that the Powell Court distinguished its opinion from Robinson by finding that
Powell committed the voluntary act of appearing in public, while California sought
to punish Robinson for the status of being an addict).
202 The Model Penal Code generally predicates the finding of a criminal offense
on first establishing that the actor committed each material element of the offense
voluntarily. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The
200
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Additionally, predicating criminal liability on the act of passing the drug to the fetus to comport with the Robinson and Powell
Courts' Eighth Amendment interpretation raises additional due
process concerns. The criminalization of prenatal-substance
abuse penalizes the physiological probability that unless the
mother is either cured of the addiction before the fetus is
harmed, miscarries or decides to abort, she may bear an infant
that is drug exposed. Thus, punishing a mother for bearing a
drug-affected child makes her choice to give birth an element of
due process
the crime and violates her Fourteenth Amendment
20 3
right to procreate and right of bodily integrity.
The Court has consistently vindicated the individual's freedom of choice in matters of family life as a fundamental liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.20 4 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 0 5
the Court struck down a Massachusetts law that made it a crime
to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons.2 0 6 The Court
Code stated in relevant part: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability
is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act
of which he is physically capable." Id. The Code also enumerated specific examples
of involuntary acts, several of which might include the in utero passage of drugs or
drug derivatives from the mother to the fetus. Id. at (2). The Code stated in relevant part: "The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; (d) a bodily movement
that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either
conscious or habitual." Id.
203 The means by which the mother's choice to give birth to the child is an element of the crime was succinctly described by the prosecutor in Johnson, who stated:
"When Jennifer Johnson smoked cocaine and she wasn't pregnant, she was just
breaking the law. . . and that was just bad. When she got pregnant, it got worse,
because that's worse. When she delivered the baby, she broke the law in the state.
She broke it." Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 28; Record on Appeal at 364-65,
Johnson (No. 89-1765). Subsequently, the trial court agreed with the prosecution
and noted that Johnson "made a choice to become pregnant and to allow those
pregnancies to come to term." State of Florida v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (Fla.
Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), appeal docketed, No. 89-1765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 31,
1989).
204 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-67 (1973) (right to abortion); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking a Virginia prohibition on interracial marriages as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives as an unconstitutional intrusion upon the right to privacy); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment a state act requiring compulsory public school attendance); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma statute mandating sterilization of habitual criminal offenders).
205 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
206 Id. at 441. The statute, § 21 of the Massachusetts General Laws Annotated,
stated in relevant part:
Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever sells, lends,
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held that a state could not interfere with single person's right to
make his or her own choices about having children no more than
it could interfere with that of married couples.2" 7 In Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur2 0 8 the Court struck down mandatory
maternity leave rules in Cleveland, Ohio, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °9 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
stated that the rules, which required each pregnant teacher to
take an unpaid maternity leave five months into gestation, 1 0 constituted a direct government intrusion into the woman's right
to
2
make her own decision on whether or not to bear children. 11
The imposition of criminal liability may directly intrude
upon the woman's right to bear children, because criminalization
is imposed when the mother carries to term and gives birth to the
infant. As a result, a state imposing criminal liability is relaying
to a substance-abusing pregnant woman the message that, unless
she aborts pregnancy, she will be prosecuted. Thus a mother,
cognizant of a physician's duty to inform state authorities of her
drug abuse, may opt to abort rather than seek the medical attengives away, exhibits. . .any drug, medicine, instrument or article
whatever for the prevention of contraception. . shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or in jail
or the house of correction for not more than two and one half years or
by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand
dollars.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 1985).
Section 21A stated in pertinent part:
A registered physician may administer to or prescribe for any married
persons drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy or
contraception. A registered pharmacist actually engaged in the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married
persons presenting a prescription from a registered physician.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21A (West 1985).
207 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Court stated that "if the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision of whether to bear or beget a child." Id.
208 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
209 Id. at 647-48.
210 The Cleveland rule provided in relevant part:
Any married teacher who becomes pregnant and who desires to return to the employ of the Board at a future date may be granted a
maternity leave of absence without pay.
APPLICATION A maternity leave of absence shall be effective not
less than five (5) months before the expected date of the normal birth of the
child.
Id. at 635 n.l.
211 Id. at 639-40. Justice Stewart stated that "[t]his Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
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tion necessary to preserve her own life as well as that of the fetus.
Equally disquieting is the possibility that an indigent mother, unable to afford the expenses attendant to obtaining a second or
third trimester abortion in a different state or country to avoid
liability for an otherwise illegal abortion, may perform it herself.
These consequences of criminalization do little to maintain the
individual's right to privacy and autonomy in matters of procreation. In fact, making the mother's choice to bear the infant an
principles espoused
element of the crime directly abrogates the
2 13
2 12 and LaFleur.
by the Court in Eisenstadt

V.

CONCLUSION

Several public policy considerations buttress the conclusion
that criminalization is an undesirable form of state intervention.
First, the current means by which prenatal-substance abuse has
been criminalized endows the state judiciary with the responsibility to legislate major and far-reaching social policy. No state has
statutorily prohibited fetal abuse by drug usage; nor has any state
expressly included the act of passing drugs to the fetus in utero in
its pre-existing prohibitions on delivery of controlled-dangerous
substances. It is logical to presume that a state seeking to do so
would first evaluate the social ramifications of the decision, and
weigh those costs and benefits against the advantages and disadvantages presented by alternatives to prosecution. This Comment asserts that the judiciary is not the proper forum to engage
in the fabrication of sweeping public policy, particularly when doing so necessarily entails prosecution based on imaginative interpretations of pre-existing statutes.214 Rather, the legislature,
which maintains access to the expansive information required to
engage in a meticulous and responsible balancing of alternatives,
should determine the most appropriate course of action.
Supporters claim that imposing criminal liability is not aimed
at punishing the mother, but instead at preventing harm to the
212 See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.

213 See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
214 The following colloquy exhibits the principle behind this conclusion:

Once, in the 1920's, [Justice] Hand closed a talk with [Justice] Holmes
by saying, with mischievous intent, 'Goodbye Mr. Justice, now go and
do justice !' Holmes, who was leaving, turned around and said,
'What's that you said ?' Hand repeated the remark. Holmes retorted:
'You know better than to say a thing like that. All we do is apply the
rules of the game.'
WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER, THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIs 264 (Oxford University Press 1973).
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fetus.215 The implication they further is that although incarceration is inherently punitive, its utility and value lie in its function
as an effective deterrent. 2 6 Although this instrumentalist perception of criminal justice might be legitimate as to other undesirable acts,21 7 it accords scant attention to the actuality that
criminalization has not proven to be an effective deterrent for
substance addicts. Every state has statutes prohibiting the possession and use of dangerous controlled substances under which
any offender, including pregnant women, may be liable. Nevertheless, narcotics abuse continues at a disheartening magnitude,
as evidenced by the prolific number of drug-exposed infants born
each year.28 Clearly, then, the effectiveness of incarceration and
other penal sanctions as deterrents must be questioned, and alternatives to prosecution must be raised.
One solution espoused by numerous legal and medical commentators proposes state intervention in the form of treatment
and education. 2 9 This suggestion is justified by a variety of con215 See, e.g., Stearns, supra note 18, at 621 (contending that "the purpose of a
prenatal-duty rule is to protect the fetus rather than to punish the mother"). One
prosecutor stated that "[w]e are not really interested in convicting women and
sending them to jail. We're just interested in getting them to stop using drugs
before they do something horrible to their babies." R. Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy:
New Issues for the Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1990, at A14. But see Nolan, supra note
140, at 18 (averring that in many cases application of old laws to prosecute addicted
mothers for fetal harms seems designed to punish as well as deter).
216 See Parness, supra note 18, at 117 (maintaining that deterrence would protect
the fetus because "punishment looms large in the minds of those who act negatively toward the unborn"). Parness added that instituting penal sanctions against
the mother for harms to the fetus would educate the mother about the "proper
distinctions between good and bad behavior" and the public through "the publicity
accompanying the trial, conviction, and sentencing." Id. at 117-18.
217 Punishment functioning as a deterrent has been traditionally recognized in
various "public welfare" offenses, including illegal sales of intoxicating liquor to
minors, sales of impure or adulterated food, violations of motor vehicle laws, and
violations of factory and labor laws, game laws and building laws. Sayre, supra note
104, at 84-88. In such cases, "[w]hether the defendant conducted its lawful business with good or evil intent was immaterial .... The purpose of the statute is to
prevent the recurrence of the nuisance, not to punish, although punishment must
be prescribed in order to make the statute effective." People v. High Ground Dairy
Co., 151 N.Y.S. 710 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915).
218 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
219 See, e.g.,
Johnsen, supra note 18, at 1011 ("Most pregnant women have every
desire to bring into this world babies as nearly perfect as possible. The challenge is
to educate these women about the necessity of prenatal care and to make that care
available to all women."); Kocsis, supra note 3, at 519-21 (advocating the allocation
of increased resources to treatment and education programs because civil and criminal liability are unworkable solutions); McGinnis, supra note 15, at 521, 536-39
(criticizing criminalization as an abandonment of criminal law principles and advocating medical treatment alternatives); Terres, supra note 8, at 79 ("Incarceration
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siderations. First, the notion of criminalization as a deterrent
necessarily encompasses the assumption that prosecuted women
will subsequently seek rehabilitative care. The legitimacy of this
supposition falters, however, when one appraises a substanceabusing pregnant woman's current access to medical care.22
Second, the fear of incarceration inevitably hinders rehabilitation efforts because it: i) increases a pregnant woman's incentive to either abort the fetus, either legally or otherwise; 2 2 ' and ii)
discourages a substance-abusing mother from giving birth in a
hospital, because of state laws requiring the attending health officials to report the potential abuse to the proper authorities.2 2
after the child is born isolates the mother from the newborn in the most essential
stages of its development and does not enable the mother to become a more responsible parent."); Thompson, supra note 15, at 367-73 (concluding that the societal costs of criminalization outweigh the benefits, and advocating a non-liability
alternative).
220 In Florida, for example, where Jennifer Johnson was convicted, it is estimated
that in 57.9% of the 897 infant cocaine exposure cases reported in 1989, the
mother received no prenatal care. See Missing Links, supra note 1, at 86 (testimony of
Gregory Coler, Secretary of Florida's Health and Rehabilitative Services). Coler
characterized the current state of Florida's treatment facilities as "woeful" in their
accessibility to women in need of preventive intervention, information, and care for
themselves and their newborns. Id. at 87.
On a national level, a 1990 survey conducted by the National Association of
State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, Inc. estimated that 280,000 pregnant women required rehabilitation treatment, but less than 11% of these women received
care. General Accounting Office Report, supra note 6, at 9. See also supra notes 146-149
and accompanying text.
Additionally, the charges for drug exposed infant care, which may exceed $
65,000, is as much as four times greater than care for other infants, and certainly
out of reach for a mother lacking adequate financial resources or receiving welfare.
Id. at 6.
221 See Legal Interventions, supra note 133, at 2667 ("Imposing criminal or civil
sanctions on pregnant women for potentially harmful behavior may also encourage
women to seek abortions in order to avoid legal repercussions.").
222 After the arrest of Stewart, the California Medical Association stated:
Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it may
discourage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from
providing accurate information to health-care providers out of fear of
self-incrimination. This failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital information concerning her health could increase the risks to herself and her baby.
Thompson, supra note 15, at 370 (quoting Declarationof the California Medical Association, the Southern California Public Health Association, and the California Division of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, contained in Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss, People v. Stewart
(No. M508197) (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987)).
Virtually every state statutorily requires physicians to immediately report suspected child abuse. PROTECTION FOR ABUSED VICTIMS: STATE LAWS AND DECISIONS
19 (I.J.
Sloan ed., 1982). Additionally, most states hold health officials liable for
failure to report, and some states even impose liability for failure to properly re-
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The immediate consequence, then, is that mothers most in need
of medical care become the least zealous to seek it. Instead of
acquiring the treatment necessary to preserve the health of the
fetus, a mother is more likely to either abort or carry the fetus to
term but refuse to seek medical attention. 2 3 In this regard,
an infant's right to
criminalization's stated purpose of vindicating
2 24
self-defeating.
is
health
be born in good
Replacing the threat of punitive sanctions with maternal
treatment and education, however, accomplishes two desirable
effects. First, it creates an incentive for pregnant-substance abusers who fear for the health of their fetuses to seek out the requisite medical attention. Rather than punish the mother for a harm
already done, the state would have the opportunity to intervene
while there might still be time to preserve the welfare of the fetus. 2 25 If the true goal of maternal prosecution is to insure that

every fetus realizes its right to be born in good health, then such
a medical intervention scheme should appeal to even the most
ardent pro-criminalization advocate. 2 6
Second, education and rehabilitation of substance abusing
port, a diagnosed case of child abuse. Id. Finally, in some cities hospital and state
officials have joined forces in the prosecution of substance abusing mothers. Paltrow, supra note 66, at 41. In Charleston and Greenville, South Carolina, hospitals
selectively test women coming in for prenatal care or delivery, and those testing
positive are immediately reported to the police by the attending physician or nurse.
Id. Often the mother, while still at the hospital, is then handcuffed and taken to jail.
Id. Paltrow described one incident wherein "one woman arrived at the jail still
bleeding from delivery; she was told to sit on a towel." Id. (citing Ellen Goetz &
Hilary Fox, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project Initial Report: Poor and Pregnant ? Don't
Go to South Carolina (Feb. 1, 1990)).
223 The facts leading up to Johnson's conviction reflect the veracity of this assertion. Johnson's delivery involved no complications, and the infants exhibited no
symptoms of drug exposure. The children were tested for cocaine only after Johnson herself, fearing for the health of the newborn, admitted her substance abuse to
the attending physician and nurse. See Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 2; Record on
Appeal at 39,Johnson (No. 89-1765) ("The State learned ofJohnson's addiction to
cocaine only because she confided her addiction to the obstetrician and nurse prior
to delivering Jessica (as she did in 1986 to the physician who delivered Carl)").
224 This assertion is especially true in light of the fact that recent medical surveys
indicate that it is possible to significantly promote the infant's welfare by getting
the infant's mother to cease drug use during the pregnancy. See GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT, supra note 144, at 8 ("The risks of low birth weight and
prematurity, which often require expensive neonatal intensive care, are minimized
by drug treatment before the third trimester.").
225 See supra note 219.
226 But see Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 30, 37 (1990) (alleging that "[plunishment is the only goal
served by defining drug use by pregnant women as a crime," and that "[i]n reality,
such prosecutions substitute punishment for protection").
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mothers would serve to deter future fetal drug exposure more
effectively than criminalization. The deterrent efficacy of existing
federal and state statutory prohibitions on use and delivery of
controlled-dangerous substances, however, is itself suspect.
Moreover, prosecuting a pregnant-substance dependent under
child-abuse and drug-delivery statutes ignores the reality that any
harm incurred by a drug-exposed fetus is a direct physiological
consequence of the mother's acute psychological and physical
need for the drug. Finally, incarceration does little to preclude a
mother from satisfying her addiction, because incarceration does
2 27
not significantly hinder an inmate's access to narcotics.
Treatment and education, however, provide the mother with
motivation and confidence to voluntarily seek the treatment that
both she and her fetus desperately require. Additionally, a nonpenal, medical form of state intervention provides this motivation without fabricating an adversarial legal relationship between
mother and infant. Finally, this approach gives the state the opportunity to rehabilitate the mother, and thus to provide the only
effective deterrent and means of promoting what some commentators term the fetus's right to be born in good health.
Michael A. Hammer
227 In fact, the mother would still have fairly easy access to narcotics, thus doing
little to mitigate her dependency problem and, if she was still pregnant, to protect
the fetus from further drug exposure. One pregnant woman who was incarcerated
reported that, during the imprisonment, she constantly received offers to "get
high." Moss, supra note 134, at 20. Moreover, prison health care officials warn that
prisons are extremely deficient in the resources necessary to accommodate pregnant women. E. Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 199-200 (1989).

